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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CLAIMS AND
DEFENSES UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS
PAUL BENJAMIN LINToN*
INTRODUCTION
Do state constitutions accord greater protection to religious freedom than
does the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment? The answer to that
question has taken on greater significance since the United States Supreme
Court decided Employment Division, Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon
v. Smith,' more than twenty years ago. In Smith, the Supreme Court
considered the case of two men who were fired by a private drug
rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote, a hallucinogenic
drug, for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of their Native American
Church.2 The men applied for unemployment compensation, but their
applications were denied on the basis of a state law disqualifying employees
discharged for work-related "misconduct."' Although the State of Oregon did
not exempt the religious use of peyote from its controlled substances law, the
Oregon Supreme Court held that to deny the men unemployment
compensation benefits because of their religious use of peyote would violate
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.' The
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supreme courts in the United States, and has published sixteen previous law review articles on a
wide variety of subjects, including several discussing state constitutional law. In January 2012,
Carolina Academic Press published the second edition of his book, ABORTION UNDER STATE
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1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2. Id. at 874.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 876 (citing Smith v. Employment Division, 763 P.2d 146 (Ore. 1988)). The First
Amendment provides, in part, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. 1. Under the incorporation doctrine,
the Free Exercise Clause applies to the States through Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment ("nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"). U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
103
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Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari and reversed the
judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that "the right of free exercise does not relieve
an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."'" The Court noted that
the only decisions in which it had held that the Free Exercise Clause
bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously
motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone,
but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press, or the right
of parents . .. to direct the education of their children.'
In such cases, the Court required the State to show that the burden
imposed on the rights affected by the law in question was the least restrictive
means available to promote a compelling state interest, a standard (known as
"strict scrutiny") which was not met in the cases cited and seldom (if ever) is
met elsewhere. "The present case," however, "does not present such a hybrid
situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative
activity or parental right."'
The respondents argued in the alternative "that even though exemption
from generally applicable criminal laws need not automatically be extended
to religiously motivated actors, at least the claim for a religious exemption
must be evaluated under the balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963)."' Under that test, "governmental actions that
substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest."9 The Court, however, rejected this argument, noting
that "[w]e have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the
Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation."o Even if
the Court "were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the
unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require
1. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
5. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
6. Id. (citing, inter alia, Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296 (invalidating a licensing system for religious
and charitable solicitations under which the administrator had discretion to deny a license to any
cause he deemed nonreligious), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidating
compulsory school-attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds
to send their children to school beyond the eighth grade)).
7. Id. at 882.
8. Id. at 882-83.
9. Id. at 883 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963)).
10. Id.
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exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law."" "The Sherbert test,"
the Court noted "was developed in a context that lent itself to individualized
governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct,"
specifically, "consideration of the particular circumstances behind an
applicant's unemployment." 2 The Court's decisions in the unemployment
cases "stand for the proposition that where the State has in place a system of
individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of
'religious hardship' without compelling reason."" Such cases "have nothing
to do with an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of
conduct." 4
The Court cautioned that "[t]he government's ability to enforce generally
applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry
out other aspects of public policy, cannot depend on measuring the effects of
a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development.""
Accordingly, "[t]o make an individual's obligation to obey such a law
contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except
where the State's interest is 'compelling' - permitting him, by virtue of his
beliefs, 'to become a law unto himself,' . . . - contradicts both constitutional
tradition and common sense." 6
Requiring a "compelling government interest ... before the government
may accord different treatment on the basis of race" or "before the
government may regulate the content of speech" ensures "equality of
treatment and an unrestricted flow of contending speech," but imposing such
a requirement with respect to laws that incidentally burden the free exercise
of religion (essentially "a private right to ignore generally applicable laws")
would be "a constitutional anomaly.""
In direct response to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment
Division v. Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 (RFRA)." RFRA prohibited government from "substantially
burden[ing]" a person's exercise of religion, even if the burden resulted from
a rule of general applicability, unless the government was able to demonstrate
that the burden, first, "is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest," and, second, "is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest." 9 In City of Boerne v. Flores,20 the
11. Id. at 884.
12. Id.
13. Id. (citation omitted).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 885 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Id. (citation omitted).
17. Id. at 885-86.
18. 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2006).
19. Id. §2000bb-1.
20. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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Supreme Court considered whether RFRA, insofar as it applies to the States,
was authorized by Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment "to enforce, by appropriate legislation," the provisions of the
Amendment (which, as noted, has been interpreted to incorporate the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment).21 The Court concluded that RFRA
was not authorized by Section 5, which confers upon Congress the power to
enact remedial or preventative measures to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, but not the power to change the substantive meaning of the
Constitution itself.22
In light of City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court's decision in
Employment Division v. Smith remains the law of the land with respect to
claims and defenses raised under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. To many, both at the time and since, Employment Division v.
Smith represented a marked retreat from the Court's former free exercise
jurisprudence.23 Whether Smith actually sounded a retreat or simply refused
to advance to a position it never occupied is certainly debatable. 24 But there
is a widespread perception that the Court abandoned positions it had held in
the past. Because of that perception, the interpretation and application of
religious freedom guarantees under state constitutions have taken on new
importance. To what extent do state courts follow federal free exercise
analysis, including Employment Division v. Smith, in interpreting their own
guarantees of religious freedom? That question acquires a particular urgency
given the current debate over a variety of controversial state laws, including
laws mandating contraceptive coverage in employee group medical plans that
provide drug prescription coverage, laws prohibiting discrimination on
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
22. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516-36.
23. See, e.g., Justice O'Connor's opinion concurring in the judgment in Smith, 494 U.S. at
892-903 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment), her dissent in City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 548-
64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), Justice Blackmun's dissent in Smith, 494 U.S. at 908 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (stating that Smith "effectuates a wholesale overturning of settled law concerning the
Religion Clauses of our Constitution"), Justice Souter's opinion concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 564-77
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); John Delaney, Police Power
Absolutism and Nullifying the Free Exercise Clause: A Critique of Oregon v. Smith, 25 IND. L. REV.
71 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court's Assault on Free Exercise, and the Amicus Brief
that Was Never Filed, 8 J. L. & RELIGION 99 (1990); Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith
and the Decline ofSupreme Court-Centrism, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 259 (1993); Michael McConnell,
Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990); Mark G. Yudof,
Religious Liberty in the Balance, 47 S.M.U. L. REV. 353 (1994).
24. See Justice Scalia's opinion concurring in part in City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 537-44
(Scalia, J., concurring in part) (responding to Justice O'Connor's critique of Smith); Philip A.
Hamburger, Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 915 (1992) (arguing that historical evidence supports Smith's interpretation of free
exercise); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 308 (1991) (defending the result, but not the reasoning in Smith); Ellis West, The Case Against
a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591 (1990).
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account of marital status and sexual orientation, and laws regulating
parochial schools and home schools. This article attempts to answer that
question by surveying the principal cases decided under each state's religious
freedom guarantee, whether expressed as "free exercise of religion,"
"freedom of worship," "liberty of conscience," "rights of conscience," or
some other formulation.25
25. For an excellent overview of the issues discussed herein, see JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW[:] LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, Vol. 1, ch. 4,
esp. § 4.06 (4th ed. 2006).
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STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSES
Alabama
Article I, section 3, of the Alabama Constitution provides, in part, "the
civil rights, privileges, and capacities of any citizen shall not be in any
manner affected by his religious principles."26 In response to the United
States Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, the people of
the state of Alabama adopted the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment
in 1998.27 The Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment, a detailed, seven-
part amendment to the Alabama Constitution, provides greater protection for
religious freedom than that guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. Under section V of the amendment, government may not
"burden a person's freedom of religion even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability," unless application of the burden to the person
promotes a "compelling governmental interest" and is the "least restrictive
means" of promoting that interest. 28 Section 3.01 has not yet been interpreted
by the Alabama reviewing courts.
Alaska
Article I, section 4, of the Alaska Constitution provides "No law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."29 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v.
Smith, the Alaska Supreme Court construed article I, section 4, consistently
with its understanding of the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause. For
example, in Frank v. State,30 the Alaska Supreme Court upheld a state and
federal free exercise defense to a criminal charge of unlawful transportation
of game, where the game in question (a freshly shot moose) was considered
an indispensable part of an Athabascan "funeral potlatch, a ceremony of
several days' duration culminating in a feast, eaten after burial of the
deceased, which is shared by members of the [Athabascan] village and
others . . . ." Citing Sherbert v. Verner,3 2 Alaska's Supreme Court held that
"[t]he freedom to act on one's religious beliefs is . . . protected, but such
26. ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
27. Id. art. 1, § 3.01. The complete text of section 3.01 is set out in the Appendix. By its express
terms, the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment is not intended "to affect, interpret, or in any
way address . . . those provisions of Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901,
regarding the establishment of religion." Id. § 3.01, sec. VI(c).
28. Id. art. 1, § 3.01, sec. V.
29. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 4.
30. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
31. Id. at 1069.
32. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
No. 2] Religious Freedom Claims and Defenses Under State Constitutions 109
protection may be overcome by compelling state interests."33 "[R]eligiously
impelled actions can be forbidden only where they pose some substantial
threat to public safety, peace or order ... or where there are competing
governmental interests that are of the highest order and ... [are] not otherwise
served . . . ."3' Thus, "in certain cases the free exercise clause requires
government to accommodate religious practices by creating exemptions from
general laws."3
A free exercise claim or defense is evaluated under a two-part test. In
order to invoke the free exercise clause, a claimant must first show that a
religion is involved, that his conduct is religiously-based, and that his
religious beliefs are sincere." If this showing is made, then it is incumbent
upon the state to demonstrate that it has a "compelling state interest" in the
challenged law, which "will suffer if an exemption is granted to
accommodate the religious practice at issue."3 In Frank, the court
determined that the defendant had properly raised a free exercise defense and
that the State had failed to show that granting an exemption to "Athabascans
needing moose meat for a funeral potlatch [would] result in so many moose
taken as to jeopardize" the State's "compelling state interest in maintaining
a healthy moose population."" Accordingly, the defendant's conviction was
reversed.39
In Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward,4 0 the Alaska Supreme Court
applied its analysis in Frank to a zoning dispute, but with a different result.
In Seward Chapel, a church and its members sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against enforcement of a zoning restriction imposed on non-
public schools. The court upheld the restriction because, first, the members
of the church did not show that they had a religious belief which would
require them to locate their church in the area from which they had been
excluded and, second, they chose to build their church in the restricted area
despite being given notice prior to acquiring the property that a parochial
school would not be permitted.4 1 The court recognized, however, that a
different question would have been presented if the city had "attempted a
wholesale exclusion of parochial schools from its confines," or if a zoning
ordinance was changed to exclude the use for which the property had been
33. Frank, 604 P.2d at 1070.
34. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
35. Id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). See also, id. at 1071 (stating that "in
order to protect religiously based conduct," "exceptions to facially neutral laws" may be required).
36. Id. at 1071.
37. Id. at 1073.
38. Id. at 1073-74.
39. Id. at 1075.
40. Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982).
41. Id. at 1302.
110 UNIV OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. VII
originally (and lawfully) developed.42 However, "[w]here, as here, a zoning
scheme as a whole provides adequate areas in which religious uses may
locate ... the exclusion of such a use from a given parcel is permissible if it
furthers a legitimate land use objective," such as "providing a quiet
residential area free of the distractions which a school may cause . . . ."
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v.
Smith, the Alaska Supreme Court continued to adhere to its pre-Smith
analysis in evaluating state free exercise claims and defenses. In Swanner v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Commission," the state supreme court considered a
state free exercise defense to a municipality's equal rights commission order
determining that a landlord's policy of not renting apartments to unmarried
couples constituted unlawful discrimination based on marital status. The
order was based upon both state and local anti-discrimination laws. The court
agreed that "a state court may provide greater protection to the free exercise
of religion under the state constitution than is now provided under the United
States Constitution" and declined to follow the Supreme Court's decision in
Employment Division v. Smith in interpreting article I, section 4, preferring,
instead, to apply its decision in Frank v. State "to determine whether the anti-
discrimination laws violate [the landlord's] right to free exercise under the
Alaska Constitution." 4 5
In Swanner, the state supreme court held that the landlord satisfied the
first part of the two-part test adopted in Frank- that "a religion is involved,"
that "the conduct in question is religiously based," and that "the claimant is
sincere in his/her religious beliefs." 46 The court, however, held that the equal
rights commission met its burden under the second part of the Frank test.47
The government has an interest in eliminating housing discrimination based
on "irrelevant characteristics" such as marital status, an interest which, in the
court's view, "is of the highest order. ."48 "Allowing housing
discrimination that degrades individuals, affronts human dignity, and limits
one's opportunities results in harming the government's ... interest in
preventing such discrimination." 49 Because that interest would "clearly
'suffer if an exemption is granted to accommodate the religious practice at
issue,"' the court concluded that enforcement of the anti-discrimination
provisions of state and municipal law against the landlord would not violate
42. Id. at 1301-02.
43. Id. at 1301 n.31.
44. 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994).
45. Id. at 280-81.
46. Id. at 281-82. (holding that state "free exercise rights" are not limited "only to actions
rooted in religious rituals, ceremonies, or practices," but extend to conduct that is "religiously
based," i.e., that it has some "arguable basis" in the tenets of one's religion.)
47. Id. at 282-84.
48. Id. at 282-83.
49. Id. at 283.
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his right to free exercise of religion under the state constitution.o
In its opinion in Swanner, the court emphasized that the burden placed
on the landlord's religion by the government's interest in eliminating housing
discrimination "falls on his conduct and not his beliefs," and, more
specifically, "his commercial activities."" For that reason, the court rejected
the landlord's argument that denying him a free exercise of religion
exemption from the law would present him with a "'Hobson's choice' - to
give up his economic livelihood or act in contradiction to his religious
beliefs."5 2 The landlord "has made no showing of a religious belief which
requires that he engage in the property-rental business," thus the "Hobson's
choice" of which he complains "is caused by his choice to enter into a
commercial activity that is regulated by anti-discrimination laws."" The state
statute and municipal ordinance in question "regulate unlawful practices in
the rental of real property and provide that those who engage in those
activities shall not discriminate on the basis of marital status."54 Conversely,
"voluntary commercial activity does not receive the same status accorded to
directly religious activity.""
In one other post-Smith decision, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a
correctional center's contact visitation rules, which prohibited all physical
contact between inmates and visitors other than a short embrace at the
beginning and the end of the visit, did not violate an inmate's free exercise
of religion rights under article I, section 4, of the state constitution.
Assuming that the inmate's request that he be allowed to hold his wife's hand
during prayer at contact visitations satisfied the first part of the Frank test,
the correctional institution was able to show, under the second part of the test,
that accommodating his request "would require significant resource outlays
to mitigate against the increased risk of contraband smuggling," which
outlays "would result from increased searches, monitoring, or both.""
Arizona
Article II, section 12, of the Arizona Constitution provides, in part, "[t]he
liberty of conscience secured by the provisions of this Constitution shall not
be so construed to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices
50. Id. at 283-84 (quoting Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979)).




55. Id. (quoting Frank, 604 P.2d 1068). In Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Right Comm'n, 102
P.3d 937, 943-47 (Alaska 2004), Swanner was reaffirmed on stare decisis grounds.
56. Larson v. Cooper, 90 P.3d 125 (Alaska 2004).
57. Id. at 132-33.
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inconsistent with the peace and safety of the this State."" The Arizona Court
of Appeals has held that the "plain language" of the first sentence of article
II, section 12, "provides limitations on the liberty of conscience protected by
the Arizona Constitution by defining what it does not protect." 9 It is,
therefore, "a limitation on the judiciary's authority to 'say what the law is' ...
but does not limit the legislature's authority to enact statutes that provide
greater protections to individual liberty of conscience than those provided in
the constitution."60 As a result, the first sentence of article II, section 12, does
not create judicially enforceable rights."
Article XX, paragraph 1, of the Arizona Constitution provides "[p]erfect
toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured to every inhabitant of this
State, and no inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested in person or
property on account of his or her mode of religious worship, or lack
thereof."62 The Arizona Supreme Court has not decided whether the Supreme
Court's free exercise analysis in Employment Division v. Smith applies to
claims and defenses based on article XX, paragraph 1.63 And research has not
disclosed any cases in which either the Arizona Supreme Court or the
Arizona Court of Appeals has consciously and deliberately departed from the
Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment in interpreting article XX, paragraph 1.
In an old decision, the Arizona Supreme Court held that a Sunday closing
law did not interfere with "religious freedom or liberty of conscience, but is
based upon the undoubted right of the Legislature to pass laws for the
preservation of health and the protection of the public welfare."' More
recently, the Arizona Court of Appeals has suggested that to state a claim
under article XX, paragraph 1, a person must establish, at a minimum, that
he was "required to do or refrain from doing" something that his religion
prohibited or commanded.65 Such a requirement would necessarily exclude
at least some claims based on religious freedom or liberty of conscience,
specifically, those not based on a claim of coercion. Nevertheless, as
previously noted, it remains undetermined whether the Arizona Supreme
Court would follow Employment Division v. Smith in interpreting article XX,
paragraph 1.
58. ARIZ. CONST. art. 11, § 12.
59. Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. American Ass'n of Pro-Life Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 257 P.3d 181, 197 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. ARIZ. CONST. art. XX, § 1.
63. See State v. Hardesty, 214 P.3d 1004, 1006 n.6 (Ariz. 2009) (rejecting a statutory free
exercise defense in a prosecution for possession of marijuana).
64. Elliott v. State, 242 P. 340, 341 (Ariz. 1926). (striking down the law on other grounds
(privileges and immunities)).
65. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 714 P.2d 412,415 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985).
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Arkansas
Article 2, section 24, of the Arkansas Constitution provides:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can,
of right, be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of
worship; or to maintain any ministry against his consent. No human
authority can, in any case or manner whatsoever, control or interfere
with the right of conscience; and no preference shall ever be given,
by law, to any religious establishment, denomination or mode of
worship, above any other.6 6
The Arkansas Supreme Court has construed the "right to worship" and
the "right of conscience" language of article 2, section 24, and the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment together.6 ' That common
construction suggests the Arkansas Supreme Court would follow
Employment Division v. Smith in evaluating claims and defenses based on
article 2, section 24, although the state supreme court has not yet had occasion
to cite Smith.
California
Article I, section 4, of the California Constitution provides, in part,
"[f]ree exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or
preference are guaranteed. This liberty of conscience does not excuse acts
that are licentious or inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State."68
The California Supreme Court has not yet decided whether it will follow
the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith in evaluating
free exercise claims and defenses under article I, section 4, of the California
Constitution.69 In all three of these cases, the court determined that the
challenged statute would withstand review even under the strict scrutiny
standard.
In North Coast Women's Care Medical Group, the California Supreme
Court considered whether article I, section 4, entitles physicians to refuse on
66. ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 24.
67. Viravonga v. Samakitham, 279 S.W.3d 44, 48-49 (Ark. 2008); see also Cude v. State, 377
S.W.2d 816, 818-20 (Ark. 1964) (upholding law mandating vaccination of school age children).
68. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
69. See North Coast women's Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Super. Ct. (Women's
Care), 189 P.3d 959, 968-69 (Cal. 2008); Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 85
P.3d 67, 90-91 (Cal. 2004); Smith v. Fair Emp't & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 929-31 (Cal.
1996) (plurality); id. at 976 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).
114 UNIV OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW& PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. VII
religious grounds to provide fertility treatment to lesbian patients in violation
of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.70 At the time, the Unruh Civil Rights Act had
been interpreted to prohibit discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, a
person's sexual orientation," an interpretation that was later expressly
incorporated into the Act. 2 The state supreme court held that the physicians
could not rely upon section 4 as a basis for refusing to provide the requested
treatment. The court stated that the state civil rights act "furthers
California's compelling interest in ensuring full and equal access to medical
treatment irrespective of sexual orientation, and there are no less restrictive
means for the state to achieve that goal." 74 The court suggested that, to avoid
any conflict between their religious beliefs and the anti-discrimination
provisions of the state civil rights act, the physicians could simply refuse to
perform the fertility treatment (intrauterine insemination) on any patient or,
alternatively, refer lesbian patients to other physicians in their practice group
who do not share their religious objections.7 ' The court's resolution of the
physicians' free exercise claim, however, was not predicated upon the
availability of such options.76
In the Catholic Charities case, the court considered whether religious
entities that object to contraception on moral grounds could challenge, on the
basis of article I, section 4, provisions in the Women's Contraception
Equality Act that require employers who provide group health care and
disability insurance prescription coverage for their employees to include
coverage for prescription contraceptives. 77 The court held that they could
not.78 Without deciding which standard of review applies to free exercise
claims and defenses under article I, section 4, the court held that the Women's
Contraception Equality Act "serves the compelling interest of eliminating
gender discrimination," and no "less restrictive (or more narrowly tailored)
means" are "readily available for achieving the state's interest in eliminating
[such] discrimination." 79 The court opined that Catholic Charities could avoid
the burden placed on their religious beliefs by the expedient of "not offering
coverage for prescription drugs" in its benefits package.so As in North Coast
Women's Care Medical Group, however, the court's resolution of the free
70. Women's Care, 189 P.3d at 968-69.
71. See Hubert v. Williams, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161, 162-64 & n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
(interpreting CAL. CIV. CODE § 51).
72. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5 1(b).
73. Women's Care 189 P.3d at 968-69.
74. Id. at 968.
75. Id. at 968-69.
76. Id.
77. Catholic Charities ofSacramento, 85 P.3d 67. The two provisions of the Act at issue have
been codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 and CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196.
78. Catholic Charities of Sacramento,85 P.3d at 90-91.
79. Id. at 92-94.
80. Id. at 91.
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exercise claim did not turn on whether Catholic Charities could or would
avail itself of this option.
Finally, in Smith v. Fair Employment," the court considered an apartment
owner's state free exercise defense to a complaint charging her with refusing
to rent an apartment to a cohabiting unmarried couple in violation of the
State's Fair Employment & Housing Act's prohibition of discrimination on
the basis of marital status." The court rejected the defense." Incorporating
by reference its earlier discussion of the federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, the court determined that the anti-discrimination language
in the Fair Housing & Employment Act did not "substantially burden [the
apartment owner's] religious exercise" because "[her] religion does not
require her to rent apartments, nor is investment in rental units the only
available income-producing use of her capital."84 Moreover, "to grant the
requested accommodation would not affect [the apartment owner] alone, but
would necessarily impair the rights and interests of third parties.""
The California Court of Appeal has followed the lead of the California
Supreme Court in evaluating free exercise claims and defenses under article
I, section 4. Without deciding which standard of judicial review applies, the
court of appeal rejected a state free exercise challenge to subpoenas duces
tecum issued by a grand jury investigating sexual abuse of minors by priests."
As the foregoing cases indicate, the California Supreme Court has not
decided whether it will follow Employment Division v. Smith in interpreting
article I, section 4, of the California Constitution. Nevertheless, the court's
apparent readiness to recognize "compelling state interests," and its equal
readiness to conclude that no less restrictive means will achieve those
interests, may suggest that free exercise claims and defenses under article I,
section 4, will be hard to sustain. As Justice Brown stated in her dissent in
Catholic Charities, "[s]trict scrutiny is not what it once was," described as
"strict in theory and fatal in fact," but "has mellowed in recent decades" to
the point where "a state's interest is compelling if the state says it is."" Thus,
"compelling interest now seems more or less coextensive with the state's
asserted exercise of police power.""
81. Smith v. Fair Emp't & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
82. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12955.
83. Smith v. Fair Emp't, 913 P.2d at 929-31.
84. Id. at 928-29.
85. Id. at 929.
86. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles v. Super. Ct., 131 Cal. Rptr. 4th 209, 224-26
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
87. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 85 P.3d 67, 105 (Cal. 2004)
(Brown, J., dissenting) (quoting Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)).
88. Id.
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Colorado
Article II, section 4, of the Colorado Constitution provides:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination, shall forever hereafter be guaranteed; and no
person shall be denied any civil or political right, privilege or
capacity, on account of his opinions concerning religion; but the
liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to
dispense with oaths or affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness or
justify practices inconsistent with the good order, peace or safety of
the state. No person shall be required to attend or support any
ministry or place of religious worship, religious sect or denomination
against his consent. Nor shall any preference be given by law to any
religious denomination or mode of worship.89
The Colorado Supreme Court has observed that "the provisions of Article
II, Section 4 ... embody the same values of free exercise and governmental
noninvolvement secured by the religious clauses of the First Amendment."90
Because the state and federal provisions "embody the same values," the court
"look[s] to the body of law that has developed in the federal courts with
respect to the meaning and application of the First Amendment for useful
guidance" in interpreting article II, section 4." Although "determination of a
first amendment challenge will not necessarily be dispositive of the state
constitutional issue,"92 the Colorado reviewing courts have consistently
relied upon the interpretation given the federal Free Exercise Clause in
construing the state free exercise clause" and upon the interpretation given
the federal Establishment Clause in construing the state "Preference
89. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 4.
90. Am. United for Separation of Church and State Fund, Inc. v. State, 648 P.2d 1072, 1081-
82 (Colo. 1982).
91. Conrad v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 622, 670-71 (Colo. 1983); see also Bishop &
Diocese of Colo. v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 91 n.5 (Colo. 1986) (noting that "[t]here is no reason to
believe that the limiting effect of article II, section 4, on the judicial resolution of church property
disputes will differ from that of the first amendment").
92. Bishop & Diocese of Colo., 716 P.2d at 91 n.5.
93. In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 563 (Colo. App. 2004) (stating that free exercise provisions
of state and federal constitutions "are subject to similar analysis") (citing Young Life v. Div. of
Emp't Training, 650 P.2d 515, 525-26 (Colo. 1982)); People in Interest of D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271,
275-76 (Colo. 1982) (construing Free Exercise Clause of First Amendment and article II, section 4,
together); In re Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1215 (Colo. App. 2006) (same). See also
Sanderson v. People, 12 P.3d 851 (Colo. App. 2000) (stating that there is no free exercise right to
assistance in committing suicide); People v. LaPorte Church of Christ, 830 P.2d 1150, 1152, (Colo.
App. 1992) (stating that there is no free exercise right for non-attorney pastor to represent church in
legal proceeding).
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Clause."94 This reliance suggests that a claim or defense that would not
prevail under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment would not
likely prevail under article II, section 4, either.
Connecticut
Article first, section 3, of the Connecticut Constitution provides:
The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination, shall forever be free to all persons in the
state; provided, that the right hereby declared and established, shall
not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or to justify
practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state."
The Connecticut reviewing courts have generally interpreted article first,
section 3, consistently with Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.96 In a fairly recent case, the
Connecticut Supreme Court treated federal precedent interpreting the scope
of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as "persuasive" in
holding that article first, section 3, protects the free exercise rights of
religious institutions, as well as those of individuals.97 The decisions of the
Connecticut reviewing courts suggest that a claim or defense that would not
prevail under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment would not
likely prevail under article first, section 3, either, although, given the few
cases that have interpreted section 3," that conclusion may not be entirely
free from doubt.
94. "In interpreting our Preference Clause we have looked to the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the body of federal cases that have construed
it." State v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 898 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Colo. 1995) (citing Conrad,
656 P.2d at 1313).
95. CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
96. See First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Historic Dist. Comm'n of the Town of Ridgefield,
737 A.2d 989, 990 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999), adopting op. in 738 A.2d 224, 231 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1998); Grimm v. Grimm, 844 A.2d 855, 859 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds and remanded with directions, 886 A.2d 391 (Conn. 2005) (stating that the statute
allowing divorce did not violate either the state or federal free exercise guarantee) (citing
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)).
97. Cambodian Buddhist Soc'y of Conn. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of the Town of
Newton, 941 A.2d 868, 881-82 (Conn. 2008).
98. As one commentator has noted, the Connecticut Supreme Court "has given § 3 no
significant independent meaning." Wesley W. Horton, THE CONNECTICUT STATE CONSTITUTION
[:] A REFERENCE GUIDE 44 (Westport, Conn. 1993).
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Delaware
Article I, section 1, of the Delaware Constitution provides, in part, that
"no power shall or ought to be vested in or assumed by any magistrate that
shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner control the rights of
conscience, in the free exercise of religious worship. . . ."9 The Delaware
Supreme Court has interpreted the "rights of conscience" language of article
I, section 1, consistently with Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."oo That consistency of interpretation
suggests that a claim or defense that would not prevail under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment would not likely prevail under
article I, section 1, either, although, given the paucity of case law interpreting
section 1, that conclusion is not entirely free from doubt.
Florida
Article I, section 3, of the Florida Constitution provides, in part, "[t]here
shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting or
penalizing the free exercise thereof. Religious freedom shall not justify
practices inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety."1o' Although the
Florida Supreme Court has not expressly held that the "free exercise"
guarantee of article I, section 3, is to be construed consistently with the
Supreme Court's construction of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, it has noted with approval decisions of the Florida District
Court of Appeals so holding. In Warner v. City of Boca Raton,'02 the state
supreme court observed that "other Florida courts have 'treated the protection
afforded under the state constitutional provision as coequal to the federal
[provision], and have measured government regulations against it
accordingly."" 3 The state supreme court also cited "a commentary on the
99. DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
100. See E. Lake Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. v. Trs. of the Peninsula-Delaware Annual
Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc., 731 A.2d 798, 805 n.2 (Del. 1999) ("[a]lthough
the controlling standards of judicial deference to religious disputes have evolved primarily from
interpretations of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, art. 1, § I of the Delaware
Constitution, enjoining 'any magistrate ... in any case' from interfering with the free exercise of
religious worship is of equal force"). See also Boyer v. Irvin, No.3304-VCN, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS
146 at *13-15 & n.13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 2007) (stating that a statute requiring the issuance of a
marriage license as a condition of entering into a valid marriage was a facially-neutral law of general
applicability which did not violate either the Free Exercise Clause or art. 1, § 1) (citing Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
101. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
102. 887 So.2d 1023 (Fla. 2004).
103. Id. at 1030 (quoting Toca v. State, 834 So.2d 204, 208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). In Toca,
the Florida District Court of Appeals applied Employment Division v. Smith to conclude that
requiring the signing of pleadings did not violate petitioner's rights under article 1, section 3, of the
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1968 revision of this provision explain[ing] that the language of the Florida
section 'parallels the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution' and that
'cases under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution are of
great value in evaluating the status of religious freedoms."'" The state
supreme court distinguished earlier cases in which it had applied the
"compelling interest" test to state free exercise claims as involving "hybrid"
claims (free exercise and privacy).io'
The Florida Supreme Court's opinion in Warner strongly suggests that
the court would follow the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence, as
set forth in Employment Division v. Smith, in evaluating claims and defenses
based on the free exercise guarantee in the state constitution.
Georgia
Article 1, section I, paragraph III, of the Georgia Constitution provides:
"Each person has the natural and inalienable right to worship God, each
according to the dictates of that person's own conscience; and no human
authority should, in any case, control or interfere with such right of
conscience."l 06 Article 1, section I, paragraph IV, provides:
No inhabitant of this state shall be molested in person or property or
be prohibited from holding any public office or trust on account of
religious opinions; but the right of freedom of religion shall not be
so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices
inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state. 0 7
In Jones v. City of Moultrie,'o the Georgia Supreme Court recognized
that under both state and federal constitutional guarantees of freedom of
religion, "the right to adopt, profess, entertain, or advocate any religious
views, or to fail or refuse so to do, is unlimited, and cannot be controlled by
any law."o' "[A] person's sentiments and opinions upon this subject are
controlled entirely by his own judgment and conscience," and, therefore,
Florida Constitution. In Warner, 887 So.2d at 1030, the Florida Supreme Court also cited Allen v.
Allen, 622 So.2d 1369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), in which the District Court of Appeals determined
that a post-dissolution order prohibiting a wife from attending the same church attended by her
former husband violated the free exercise clauses of both the state and federal constitutions.
104. Id. (quoting Talbot D'Alemberte, Commentary to 1968 Revision, Art. 1, § 3, Fla. Const.,
25A Fla. Stat. Ann. 106-07 (West 2004)).
105. Id. at 1031 n.6 (distinguishing Pub. Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So.2d 96, 98 (Fla. 1989),
and In re Dubreuil, 629 So.2d 819, 828 (Fla. 1993)).
106. GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, Ill.
107. Id. art. 1, § I, 1 IV.
108. 27 S.E.2d 39 (Ga. 1943).
109. Id. at 42.
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"[t]he courts will ever guard the right to a full and unlimited exercise of one's
religious beliefs."'"o Nevertheless, "[w]hile there is no power to control what
a person may believe about religion or the type of religion he may adopt or
profess, yet there is a power under the law to limit his acts, even though to
do such acts may be part of his religious belief."'" The court then elaborated
on this theme:
The constitutional guarantee of the exercise of religious freedom
does not extend to acts which are inimical to the peace, good order,
and morals of society. Under the claim of a religious privilege one
could not practice promiscuous sexual intercourse, or offer up a
human sacrifice, or practice public nudeness; because the laws of
society, designated to secure its peace, prosperity, and the morals of
its people are affected. All of the foregoing are plain and well-
recognized instances of curtailment of activities in furtherance of
religious beliefs, and are so well implanted in the minds of our people
that statutes prohibiting these acts may well be denominated as being
based upon moral law. Yet limitations upon religious activities are
not confined to instances where such acts are in contravention of
moral law; as the right to exercise these activities ends where the
rights of others begin. A person's right to exercise religious freedom,
which may be manifested by acts, ceases where it overlaps and
transgresses the rights of others. Every one's rights must be exercised
with due regard for the rights of others. . . . To construe this
constitutional right as being unlimited, and to hold as privileged any
act if based upon religious belief, would be to make the professed
doctrine of religious faith superior to the law of the land, and in effect
would permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."2
In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority,"' the Georgia
Supreme Court unanimously denied the request for a stay of a superior court
order authorizing a county hospital authority to perform a caesarian section
and any necessary blood transfusions upon a woman in the thirty-ninth week
of pregnancy, in the event that she presented herself to the hospital for
delivery of her unborn child, despite the woman's (and her husband's)
religious objections to surgery and blood transfusions. The basis for the order
was that, given the woman's medical condition (placenta previa and the
unborn child's presentation), there was a 99% certainty that the child could




113. 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).
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delivery were no better than 50%.114 If the baby were delivered by caesarian
section prior to the commencement of labor, there would be "an almost 100%
chance of preserving the life of the child, along with that of defendant."".
The court determined that the State's authority, as parens patriae, overrode
the religious objections of the pregnant woman and her husband, who were
Jehovah's Witnesses."' And in Anderson v. State,"7 the Georgia Court of
Appeals rejected a state freedom of religion challenge to a statute requiring
the vaccination of school-age children.
The religious freedom guarantees of the Georgia Constitution have not
been the subject of much litigation and neither the Georgia Supreme Court
nor the Georgia Court of Appeals have had occasion to cite or apply
Employment Division v. Smith in a case arising under the state constitution.
Accordingly, it cannot be determined whether the Georgia Supreme Court
will follow Smith in evaluating claims and defenses based on article 1, section
1, paragraphs III or IV.
Hawaii
Article I, section 4, of the Hawaii Constitution provides, in part, "[n]o
law shall be enacted respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. . . .""' Although, without discussion of article I,
section 4, the Hawaii Supreme Court has applied the Supreme Court's
decision in Employment Division v. Smith to similar facts," 9 it has not yet
decided whether it will follow Employment Division v. Smith in interpreting
article I, section 4.120 In State v. Adler,12 ' the state supreme court applied the
pre-Smith standard, but held that the defendant had failed to show that he had
been substantially burdened in the exercise of his religious freedom.'22
Accordingly, it cannot be determined whether the Hawaii Supreme Court will
follow Smith in evaluating claims and defenses based on article I, section 4.
114. Id. at 458.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 460.
117. 65 S.E.2d 848 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951).
118. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through Jan. 2013 Regular Sess.).
119. See State v. Sunderland, 168 P.3d 526, 531-34 (Haw. 2007).
120. See Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple of Haw. v. Sullivan, 953 P.2d 1315, 1344 n.31
(last paragraph) (Haw. 1998) (not reaching issue).
121. 118 P.3d 652 (Haw. 2005).
122. Id. at 659-61 (holding that the state did not have to prove that it has a "compelling interest"
in prohibiting the possession or cultivation of fifty or more marijuana plants where defendant failed
to demonstrate that his religion required possession or cultivation of marijuana plants in such
quantities).
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Idaho
Article I, section 4, of the Idaho Constitution provides:
The exercise and enjoyment of religious faith and worship shall
forever be guaranteed; and no person shall be denied any civil or
political right, privilege, or capacity on account of his religious
opinions; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be
construed to dispense with oaths or affirmations, or excuse acts of
licentiousness or justify polygamous or other pernicious practices,
inconsistent with morality or the peace and safety of the state; nor to
permit any person, organization, or association to directly or
indirectly aid or abet, counsel or advise any person to commit the
crime of bigamy or polygamy, or any other crime. No person shall
be required to attend or support any ministry or place of worship,
religious sect or denomination, or pay tithes against his consent; nor
shall any preference be given by law to any religious denomination
or mode of worship. Bigamy and polygamy are forever prohibited in
the state, and the legislature shall provide by law for the punishment
of such crimes.123
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that the provisions of
article I, section 4, "bear no resemblance to those found in the First
Amendment and appear to be the product of Idaho's unique religious
history."l24 The Idaho Supreme Court has suggested that, at least in certain
contexts, article I, section 4, provides "an even greater guardian of religious
liberty" than the First Amendment.'25 The state supreme court, however, has
not yet upheld a state "free exercise" claim or defense that would not have
been upheld under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. More
recent cases clearly imply that the Idaho courts apply a "Smith-like" standard
to state free exercise claims and defenses.
In Hyde v. Fischer,'26 the Idaho Court of Appeals held that, "by
prohibiting government from imposing any substantial burden on a prison
inmate's religious exercise unless the burden is justified by a compelling, and
not just a legitimate, governmental interest, RLUIPA'27 accords greater
123. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4.
124. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 450 (9th Cir. 1994). Presumably, the court
was referring to the struggle to suppress polygamy in Idaho.
125. Osteraas v. Osteraas, 859 P.2d 948, 953 (Idaho 1993) ("[D]enying a parent custody
because of certain entertained religious beliefs, or lack thereof, clearly would be denying that parent
a civil right because of such religious opinions or beliefs" which would violate article I, section 4,
even if it did not violate the First Amendment.).
126. 203 P.3d 712 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009).
127. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
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protection to an inmate than the Free Exercise Clause of both the Idaho and
federal constitutions." 28 The unmistakable implication of this statement is
that article I, section 4, does not generally require a compelling interest to
justify a burden on the free exercise of religion. In State v. Fluewelling,129 the
Idaho Supreme Court considered both a federal and a state free exercise of
religion defense in a prosecution for possession of marijuana. After disposing
of the former argument on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in
Employment Division v. Smith,' the court rejected the latter argument on
virtually identical grounds:
This provision in the Constitution [referring to art. I, § 4] does not
protect against prosecution for conduct that violates a neutral
criminal statute of general applicability simply because such conduct
may be engaged in for religious reasons. It was intended, in part, to
permit the criminalization of bigamy and polygamy even if it was
engaged in as a religious practice. This section expressly provides
that "the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be
construed ... to permit any person ... to directly or indirectly aid or
abet, counsel or advise any person to commit ... any other crime."
"'Laws are made for the government of action; and while they cannot
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices."'l31
The opinion in Fluewelling does not preclude the possibility that the
Idaho Supreme Court will give a broader reading to article I, section 4, than
the Supreme Court has given to the Free Exercise Clause, at least outside the
context of criminal laws, but it does suggest that a claim or defense that would
not prevail under the Free Exercise Clause is not likely to prevail under article
I, section 4, either.
Illinois
Article I, section 3, of the Illinois Constitution provides:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination, shall forever be guaranteed, and no person
shall be denied any civil or political right, privilege or capacity, on
account of his religious opinions; but the liberty of conscience hereby
128. Hyde, 203 P.3d at 732.
129. 249 P.3d 375 (Idaho 2011).
130. Id. at 377-78.
131. Id. at 378 (quoting Toncray v. Budge, 95 P. 26, 35, 37 (Idaho 1908)).
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secured shall not be construed to dispense with oaths or affirmations,
excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with
the peace or safety of the State. No person shall be required to attend
or support any ministry or place of worship against his consent, nor
shall any preference be given by law to any religious denomination
or mode of worship.132
The Illinois reviewing courts have held that the rights secured by article
I, section 3, are no broader than those secured by the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.'33 Because of this
equivalency of interpretation, a free exercise claim or defense that would not
prevail under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment would not
likely prevail under the free exercise guarantee of article I, section 3, either.
Indiana
Article 1, section 2, of the Indiana Constitution provides: "All people
shall be secured in the natural right to worship ALMIGHTY GOD, according
to the dictates of their own consciences."' 34 Additionally, article 1, section 3,
provides "No law shall, in any case whatever, control the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience."13
Sections 2 and 3 of article I have been the subject of relatively little litigation.
In an old case, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a local board of health's
emergency order excluding children who had not been vaccinated for
smallpox from school.' 36 In a more recent case, the state supreme court held
that a statute requiring a driver's license to bear a photograph of the licensee
could not be constitutionally applied to members of a Pentecostal church who
objected on religious grounds to the requirement where alternative means of
identifying the driver were available to the State. 33 It was not until 2001,
however, that the court clearly and unequivocally held that the religion
clauses of the state constitution were not to be construed in conformity with
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.' 3 1
132. ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (West, Westlaw through 2013).
133. People v. Falbe, 727 N.E.2d 200, 207 (Ill. 2000) ("[A]ny statute which is valid under the
first amendment is also valid under the Constitution of Illinois.") (Establishment Clause); Mefford
v. White, 770 N.E.2d 1251, 1260 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (Free Exercise Clause).
134. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2013).
135. Id., art. 1, § 3. Section 4 ofarticle I prohibits religious preferences and compelled religious
support.
136. Vonnegut v. Baun, 188 N.E. 677 (Ind. 1934).
137. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer, 380 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind.
1978).
138. City Chapel of Evangelical Free, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 744 N.E.2d 443 (Ind. 2001).
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In City Chapel Evangelical Free, Inc. v. City ofSouth Bend,'39 the Indiana
Supreme Court held that, in a proceeding brought by a municipality to
condemn a building owned by a church and used for religious ministry, the
church was entitled to a hearing on its objections to the condemnation based
on asserted violations of the religious liberty guarantees of the state
constitution. As a threshold matter, the state supreme court rejected the city's
contention "that the Indiana Constitution's guarantees of religious protection
should be equated with those of its federal counterpart and that federal
jurisprudence therefore governs the interpretation of our state guarantees." 40
Given the number of provisions in the state constitution relating to religious
liberty and their phrasing, the court concluded that "the religious liberty
provisions of the Indiana Constitution were not intended merely to mirror the
federal First Amendment."l 4' The court also rejected the city's argument that
the "core values" of sections 2 and 3 "encompass only the 'personal
devotional aspect' of worship." 42
From the literal text of Sections 2 and 3, the discussions at the
Constitutional Convention, and the surrounding circumstances, we
conclude that the framers and ratifiers of the Indiana Constitution's
religious liberty clauses did not intend to afford only narrow
protection for a person's internal thoughts and private practices of
religion and conscience. By protecting the right to worship according
to the dictates of conscience and the rights freely to exercise religious
opinion and to act in accord with personal conscience, Sections 2 and
3 advance core values that restrain government interference with the
practice of religious worship, both in private and in community with
other persons. 143
Finally, the court quickly disposed of the city's argument that "the only
constitutional inhibition on the taking of private property for public use is the
requirement of just compensation." 44 The constitutional requirement of just
compensation "does not authorize the State to ignore other provisions of the
constitution when acting pursuant to its powers of eminent domain." 45
Relying upon its earlier decision in Price v. State,146 the court in City
Chapel held that "the police power of the State is limited and may not
139. Id.
140. Id. at 446.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 448.
143. Id. at 450.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 622 N.E.2d 954 (Ind. 1993).
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materially burden one of the core values embodied within each provision of
the Bill of Rights of Indiana's Constitution."l47 "The power of eminent
domain is a police power subject to this limitation."'4 8 Accordingly, City
Chapel was entitled to an opportunity to present its claim that South Bend's
condemnation of its property would "materially burden its rights embodied
in the core values" of the religion clauses of the state constitution.'4 9 On
remand, "the condemnation procedure will be presumed to be constitutional,"
a presumption City Chapel would have the burden of overcoming, "with all
doubts to be resolved against it."' City Chapel would have to demonstrate
that "the taking of its church building by condemnation, under the
circumstances presented in this case, materially burdens its members' right
to worship according to the dictates of conscience ... the right freely to
exercise religious opinions and rights of conscience," or "the right to be free
from a government preference for a particular religious society or mode of
worship.""' A burden is not "material," the court explained, unless "'the
right, as impaired, would no longer serve the purpose for which it was
designed. .. ."'52 In determining whether a burden is "material," the court in
the eminent domain proceeding should "exclud[e] any consideration for the
social utility of the proposed condemnation. . . ."'" Although City Chapel
"carries a very substantial burden of proof," it was "entitled to an opportunity
to present its claim for judicial determination."' 54
The Indiana Supreme Court's opinion in City Chapel makes it clear that
the court will not apply federal free exercise analysis to claims and defenses
raised under the religious freedom guarantees of the state constitution.
Whether the court's "material burden" standard, which presumes that the
governmental action is constitutional and places a "substantial burden of
proof' on the challenger to show that his "right, as impaired, would no longer
serve the purpose for which it was designed," will result in outcomes
significantly different from those that would have been reached under the
Free Exercise Clause, however, remains to be determined. No case decided
since City Chapel sheds any light on this question.
147. City Chapel, 744 N.E.2d at 450.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 451.
151. Id. (referring to article 1, sections 2, 3 and 4). In addition to its claims under §§ 2 and 3 of
art. 1, City Chapel argued that the city had violated § 4 by "permitting another church located in a
redevelopment district to remain." Id. at 445.
152. Id. at 451 (quoting Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 960 n.7 (Ind. 1993)).
153. Id. Under the analysis set forth in Price, there is no "balancing" or "weighing" of the
competing private and state interests at stake. The only question is whether a "core value" embodied
in the state constitution has been "materially burdened." If it has been, the burden is
unconstitutional. Price, 622 N.E.2d at 960-61 & n.7.
154. City Chapel, 744 N.E.2d at 451.
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Iowa
Article I, section 3, of the Iowa Constitution provides, in part, "[t]he
general assembly shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . ."' The establishment and free
exercise provisions set forth in the first clause of article I, section 3, generally
have been interpreted consistently with Supreme Court precedent interpreting
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.' "To
the extent [art. I, § 3] differs from the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution we think our framers were merely addressing the evils incident
to the state church."' Although the Iowa Supreme Court has not yet relied
upon Employment Division v. Smith in interpreting the state free exercise of
religion guarantee,' the court's interpretation of article I, section 3, suggests
that a claim or defense that would not prevail under the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment would not likely prevail under article I, section 3,
either.
Kansas
Section 7 of the Kansas Bill of Rights provides, in part:
The right to worship God according to the dictates of conscience
shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to attend
or support any form of worship; nor shall any control of or
interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, nor any
preference be given by law to any religious establishment or mode
155. IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 3 (West, Westlaw through 2013).
156. See, e.g., Kliebenstein v. Iowa Conference of the United Methodist Church, 663 N.W.2d
404, 406 (Iowa 2003) (analyzing the Establishment Clauses of the state and federal constitutions
simultaneously); Hope Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue and Finance, 463
N.W.2d 76, 79-82 (Iowa 1990) (same with respect to Free Exercise Clauses).
157. Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125, 132 (Iowa 1976).
158. In Mitchell Cnty. v. Zimmerman, 810 N.W.2d I (Iowa 2012), the Iowa Supreme Court
upheld a First Amendment free exercise of religion defense to a charge of operating a tractor with
steel-cleated wheels on a hard surface roadway in violation of a road protection ordinance. The
defendant was a member of the Old Order Groffdale Conference Mennonite Church which forbids
its members from driving tractors unless their wheels are equipped with steel cleats. In a thoughtful
and exhaustive opinion, the court determined, first, that, although the ordinance was facially neutral,
it was "too underinclusive to be of general applicability, thus requiring strict scrutiny" review; and,
second, that the "ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve an asserted compelling interest in
protecting the integrity of the county's roads." Id. The court expressly did not reach the question as
to whether the defendant's "rights under article 1, section 3 of the Iowa Constitution have also been
violated." Id. at 18. See also Planned Parenthood of Mid-Iowa v. Maki, 478 N.W.2d 637, 640 (Iowa
1991) (citing Smith in rejecting a federal free exercise defense to an action brought to enjoin the
defendant from interfering with access to an abortion clinic).
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of worship.'
In State ex rel. Pringle v. Heritage Baptist Temple,' the Kansas
Supreme Court, commenting upon the state and federal religion clauses,
stated:
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 7 of the
Kansas Bill of Rights embrace two concepts: the prohibition of
establishment of religion by government, and the guarantee of the
free exercise of religion by all persons. It thereby prevents state
compulsory religion and also safeguards the free exercise of
religion."'
That the state and federal constitutions "embrace" the same two concepts
- the prohibition of the establishment of a religion and the guarantee of the
free exercise of religion - does not necessarily mean that they will be
construed in a consistent manner. In fact, the case law is mixed on whether
the Kansas courts will follow the Supreme Court's decision in Employment
Division v. Smith in interpreting the freedom of worship and rights of
conscience secured by § 7 of the Kansas Bill of Rights.
In Stinemetz v. Kansas Health Policy Authority,'62 the Kansas Court of
Appeals considered a claim by a Medicaid patient that the Kansas Health
Policy Authority wrongfully refused to authorize and reimburse her for the
cost of a surgical procedure. The patient, who needed a liver transplant, was
a Jehovah's Witness who objected to any surgical procedure that would
require a blood transfusion.'63 The procedure she was willing to undergo - a
"bloodless liver transplant" - was not performed at any medical facility in
the State, but was available in other states.1' The state agency would have
authorized and reimbursed the patient for the cost of the procedure if it had
been available in Kansas, but it had a policy of not reimbursing procedures
performed outside of the state.165 The state court of appeals held that the
denial of reimbursement violated both the patient's free exercise rights under
the First Amendment and her rights of conscience under section 7 of the state
bill of rights, but on different grounds.166
159. KAN. CONST., BILL OF RIGHTS, § 7.
160. 693 P.2d 1163 (Kan. 1985).
161. Id. at 1165. See also Lower v. Bd. of Dir. of the Haskell Cnty. Cemetery Dist., 56 P.3d
235, 245-46 (Kan. 2002) (construing Free Exercise Clause and section 7 of the Kansas Bill of Rights
together); Corder v. Kansas Bd. of Healing Arts, 889 P.2d 1127, 1137 (Kan. 1994) (same).
162. 252 P.3d 141 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011).
163. Id. at 144.
164. Id. at 145.
165. Id.
166. Id at 161.
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With respect to the patient's federal free exercise claim, the court of
appeals acknowledged that the state agency's regulations not allowing
Medicaid patients to be reimbursed for out-of-state medical procedures did
not single out Jehovah's Witnesses, but were "neutral and generally
applicable" and had only an "incidental effect of burdening . .. her religious
beliefs."l67 Thus, under the general principle enunciated in Employment v.
Smith, the regulations did not have to be justified by a compelling
governmental interest.' 8 The court, however, determined that the patient's
federal free exercise claim fell within an exception recognized in Smith for
those statutes or regulations that create a system of individual exemptions.'69
Because the state Medicaid regulations allowed for individual exemptions on
a case-by-case basis, the state agency could not refuse to extend the
exemption to cover the patient's religious hardship without providing a
compelling reason to do so.' The agency was unable to advance any such
interest, however, and, therefore, its refusal to authorize and reimburse the
patient for the out-of-state surgical procedure violated the Free Exercise
Clause."' Although the court could have ended its discussion at that point,
it proceeded to evaluate the patient's claim under section 7 of the state bill of
rights.'72
With respect to the patient's state "rights of conscience" claim, the court
of appeals began its analysis by citing two cases in which the state supreme
court and the court of appeals had departed from federal free exercise analysis
in interpreting section 7.17 In the first case, State v. Smith, the state supreme
court, relying upon section 7, struck down, as applied to Jehovah's
Witnesses, a public school board's directive that teachers exclude from
school any children who refuse to salute the flag, which would have made
the children truants.'74 Smith was decided after the Supreme Court had upheld
a statute mandating flag-saluting,' but before the Court reversed course and
struck down a similar statute in another case.176 In the second case, State v.
Evans, 71 the court of appeals threw out, as conditions of probation, a
requirement that a convicted defendant attend a church and also provide
1,000 hours of maintenance work at that church. Those "religious conditions"
unreasonably restricted the probationer's constitutional freedom because
167. Id. at 151.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 152-55.
170. Id. at 155.
171. Id. at 155-56.
172. Id. at 156.
173. Id. at 156-57 (citing State v. Smith, 127 P.2d 518 (1942), and State v. Evans, 796 P.2d 178
(Kan. Ct. App. 1990)).
174. Smith, 127 P.2d at 522-23.
175. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
176. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
177. Evans, 796 P.2d at 179-80.
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they would require him "to continue association with a specific church for a
five-year period, regardless of whether he continues to accept its religious
beliefs and doctrines.""' It was not apparent how the conditions requiring
church attendance and maintenance work at the church "could be
characterized as bearing a reasonable relationship to the protection of the
public or the offense committed," nor could it be concluded that they were
necessary to promote "a compelling state interest. . . ."' Accordingly, the
conditions of probation were reversed and the case was remanded for
resentencing before a different judge.'s In Stinemetz, the court of appeals
noted that Evans "could have followed the more permissible analysis in
Employment v. Smith had it wanted to do so,""' and purported to derive some
significance from the fact that the state supreme court later cited Evans in
support of the general proposition that "a district court does not have
discretion to impose probationary conditions that violate a probationer's
constitutional rights, absent a compelling state interest." 82
The court of appeals reliance on Evans and Bennett in support of a
broader reading of the "rights of conscience" language of section 7 of the
Kansas Bill of Rights than the Supreme Court has given the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment may be questioned. Both Evans and Bennett
involved conditions of probation, which quintessentially involve the kind of
individual assessment that the Supreme Court recognized in Employment v.
Smith as an exception to its rule regarding general laws of neutral
applicability. Moreover, Evans and Bennett held that the probation conditions
challenged in those cases violated both the state and the federal
constitutions."' Although the Kansas Supreme Court's 1942 decision in State
v. Smith tends to support the Stinemetz holding that section 7 is broader in
scope than the Free Exercise Clause, Stinemetz overlooked a far more recent
opinion of the Kansas Supreme Court suggesting otherwise.
In Lower v. Board of Directors of the Haskell County Cemetery
District,'8 4 the Kansas Supreme Court, construing the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment and section 7 of the Kansas Bill of Rights together,
and relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Employment v. Smith, held
that a county cemetery board could rely upon a statute limiting the uses of
178. Id.
179. Id. at 180.
180. Id.
181. Stinemetz v. Kansas Health Policy Auth., 252 P.3d 141, 157 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011).
182. State v. Bennett, 200 P.3d 455, 459 (Kan. 2009) (cited in Stinemetz, 252 P.3d at 157).
183. Evans, 796 P.2d at 178 (agreeing with defendant that the "religious conditions" imposed
as conditions of probation "violate his right to the free exercise of religion as guaranteed by the
United States Constitution and the Kansas Constitution"); Bennett, 200 P.3d at 463 (requiring
probationer to submit to random, suspicionless searches violated the search and seizure provisions
of both the state and federal constitutions).
184. 56 P.3d 235 (Kan. 2002).
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cemetery lots to purposes of sepulture to compel the owners of a cemetery
lot to remove a monument they had erected memorializing all unborn
children.' In several other cases, the Kansas Supreme Court and the Kansas
Court of Appeals have relied upon Employment v. Smith in rejecting federal
free exercise defenses, without, however, addressing section 7 of the state
Bill of Rights.'86
In Stinemetz, the court of appeals determined that the language of section
7 of the Kansas Bill of Rights is similar to article I, section 16, of the
Minnesota Constitution and article I, section 7, of the Ohio Constitution and,
therefore, should be interpreted in a similar manner.'8 7 In Stinemetz, the court
of appeals adopted a four-part test that had been developed by the Ohio
Supreme Court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals in applying their "liberty
of conscience" provisions.' Under that test, the person raising a religious
freedom claim or defense has the burden of demonstrating that he has a
sincerely held religious belief and that the state action in question burdens
him in the exercise of his beliefs. Once that demonstration has been made,
the burden shifts to the state to show that it has a compelling interest at stake
and that no less restrictive means is available to achieve its interest."' For the
same reasons the court of appeals relied upon in holding that the state's non-
reimbursement policy violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, the court held that the policy also violated section 7 of the
Kansas Bill of Rights.' 0
The Kansas Court of Appeals opinion in Stinemetz is not necessarily an
accurate predictor that state rights of conscience claims and defenses will be
treated differently than federal free exercise claims and defenses. The state
constitutional analysis in Stinemetz was dictum, as the court itself recognized;
the result in the case was the same under either state or federal analysis; two
of the Kansas cases the court cited (Evans, Bennett) do not support an
185. Id. at 245-46. See also Harrison v. Tauheed, 256 P.3d 851, 862 (Kan. 2011) ("[All
individuals in Kansas have the right to religious freedom, protected by both the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and the Kansas Bill of Rights.") (citing
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. V. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876 (1990)).
186. See, e.g., Corder v. Kansas Bd. of Healing Arts, 889 P.2d 1127, 1137 (Kan. 1994)
(rejecting free exercise of religion defense in disciplinary proceeding temporarily suspending
physician's license to practice because physician was "psychotic" and his "delusions [regarding
UFOs] might influence his medical practice"); State v. McBride, 955 P.2d 133, 138 (Kan. Ct. App.
1998) ("A state may pass a law of general applicability that incidentally burdens the practice of
religion without violating the First Amendment.") (rejecting free exercise defense in prosecution
for cultivation of marijuana).
187. Stinemetz, 252 P.3d at 157-160. The text of those provisions is set forth in the Minnesota
and Ohio sections of this article, infra. The Kansas Constitution was based in large part on the Ohio
Constitution. Id. at 158 (citing proceedings of the Wyandotte Constitutional Convention of 1859).
188. Id. at 160 (citing Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2000), and Shagalow v. State
of Minnesota, Dep't of Human Services, 725 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 160-61.
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independent interpretation of section 7 because they concerned
individualized assessments (conditions of probation), which are not subject
to the general rule enunciated in Employment v. Smith; and the court
overlooked a Kansas Supreme Court decision (Lower) that interpreted
section 7 consistently with the Free Exercise Clause and rejected both state
and federal claims in an opinion that relied upon Employment v. Smith. At
this point, therefore, it cannot be determined whether the Kansas Supreme
Court will follow Smith in evaluating claims and defenses based upon section
7.
Kentucky
Section 1 of the Kentucky Constitution provides in part, "All men...
have certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned:
... [t]he right of worshiping Almighty God according to the dictates of their
consciences.""' Section 5 provides, in part, "No human authority shall, in
any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience."' 9 2
In Triplett v. Livingston County Board of Education,' the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, relying principally upon Supreme Court authorities,
including Employment Division v. Smith, rejected both state and federal free
exercise claims challenging an educational statute requiring all school age
children to take standardized examinations.'94 Citing Triplett and other state
court decisions,'95 a federal district court has noted that "Kentucky courts
have looked to the United States Supreme Court for guidance in interpreting
provisions of the Kentucky Constitution that deal with religious freedom."' 96
In light of that practice, a claim or defense that would not prevail under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment would not likely prevail under
section 1 or section 5, either.
191. KY. CONST. § 1.
192. Id. § 5.
193. 967 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).
194. Id. at 31-33. In its discussion of the state freedom of religion claims, the court stated that
the Commonwealth had a "compelling" interest in the education of its children and that in order to
"measure performance in terms of educational equality and progress," it was necessary for all
students to take the standardized examinations. Id. at 33.
195. In Mosier v. Barren County Board of Health, 215 S.W.2d 967, 969 (Ky. 1948), the
Kentucky Court of Appeals (now the Kentucky Supreme Court) rejected a state free exercise
challenge to a school board resolution requiring school children to be vaccinated for smallpox.
196. Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528, 539 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (citations
omitted).In Hyman, the district court rejected state and federal claims challenging ordinances
prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. Id.
at 536-40.
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Louisiana
Article I, section 8, of the Louisiana Constitution provides, "No law shall
be enacted respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof"'9 7 Section 8 is a "paraphrase" of the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and was intended to
"adopt the federal standard.19 This intention is confirmed by the case law
interpreting section 8,' as well as its constitutional history.200 Given the
intention to "adopt" the federal standard, a claim or defense that would not
prevail under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment would not
likely prevail under article I, section 8, either.
Maine
Article I, section 3, of the Maine Constitution provides, in part:
All individuals have a natural and unalienable right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences,
and no person shall be hurt, molested or restrained in that person's
liberty or estate for worshiping God in the manner and season most
agreeable to the dictates of that person's own conscience, nor for that
person's religious professions or sentiments, provided that that
person does not disturb the public peace, nor obstruct others in their
religious worship;-and all persons demeaning themselves
peaceably, as good members of the State, shall be equally under the
protection of the laws, and no subordination nor preference of any
one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by
law . . . .201
197. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
198. Lee Hargrave, THE LOUISIANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 33
(Westport, Conn. 1991).
199. Seegers v. Parker, 241 So.2d 213, 216 (La. 1970) (predecessor section to LA. CONST.
article 1, section 8, "embodies ... in full" the "establishment and free exercise clauses of the First
Amendment"). See also Op. Att'y Gen., No. 75-1731, Jan. 9, 1976 (because the language of LA.
CONST. article 1, section 8, is virtually identical to the parallel provision in the Federal Constitution,
the two constitutional provisions should be interpreted in a like manner, and decisions of the United
States Supreme Court construing the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment are applicable in
determining the limitations section 8 imposes on the state legislature).
200. VI RECORDS OF THE LOUSIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973: CONVENTION
TRANSCRIPT 1126. Delegate Weiss remarked that what is now section 8 is a "reiteration of the first
two lines of the Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution and is a streamlining of the old Louisiana
Constitution." He further remarked the framers intended that in interpreting section 8, the Louisiana
Supreme Court would follow federal jurisprudence in interpreting the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment. Id. at 1126-27.
201. ME. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
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The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has held that analysis under the "anti-
subordination" and "anti-preference" language of article I, section 3, and the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment is the same.202 in interpreting
the "right to worship" language of section 3, however, the state supreme court
has departed from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause as set forth in Employment Division v. Smith, preferring, instead, to
adhere to the pre-Smith jurisprudence.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court applied federal free exercise analysis in evaluating what it
characterized as state "free exercise" challenges, and declined to give article
I, section 3, a broader reading than the Supreme Court had given to the Free
Exercise Clause.203
Supreme Court decisions over the last quarter-century have yielded
a four-stage framework for analysis of claims of violations of the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Initially, the burden
of proof is on the person raising the constitutional challenge to the
government regulation in question. The challenger must initially
demonstrate:
1) that the activity burdened by the regulation is motivated by a
sincerely held religious belief; and
2) that the challenged regulation restrains the free exercise of that
religious belief.
If the challenger meets that two-fold threshold requirement, the
burden shifts and the State can prevail only by proving both:
3) that the challenged regulation is motivated by a compelling public
interest; and
4) that no less restrictive means can adequately achieve that
compelling public interest.20
In Blount, the court rejected a free exercise challenge to a statute
requiring the State's approval of alternatives to attendance at public school,
including home schooling. The court agreed with the parents of home
schooled children that the challenged statute burdened them in the exercise
of their sincerely held religious belief that children should be educated at
home and their belief that "to apply for state approval for their home
202. Bagley v. Raymond School Dep't, 728 A.2d 127, 132 (Me. 1999). See also Squires v.
Inhabitants of City of Augusta, 153 A.2d 80, 87-88 (Me. 1959) (state and federal separation of
church and state principles are the same).
203. Blount v. Dep't of Educ. & Cultural Services, 551 A.2d 1377, 1385 (Me. 1988).
204. Id. at 1379.
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schooling program, or in any way to acknowledge the State's authority to
approve or to disapprove alternatives to compulsory public education, would
be an act of apostasy."20 5 The court, however, determined that the State has a
compelling public interest in educational quality which could not be met by
any less restrictive means.20 None of the alternatives proposed by the
parents, even the use of standardized tests, would have recognized the State's
regulatory authority over education.207 "[]o reasonable compulsory
education system can accommodate that last, irreconcilable objection."208
In its first post-Smith decision interpreting the "free exercise" guarantee
of article I, section 3, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court adhered to the "four-
stage framework" it had followed in Blount. In Rupert v. City ofPortland,20 9
the state supreme court rejected a free exercise of religion claim to recover a
marijuana pipe seized by the police as drug paraphernalia. Assuming that the
plaintiff had used the pipe in the exercise of a sincerely held religious belief,
the court held that the State had a "compelling public interest in preventing
the distribution and use of illegal drugs," which interest could be "adequately
protected only by rules of general application."210 To allow a religious
exemption of the breadth sought by the plaintiff, "would severely hamper the
public's effort to control the amount of marijuana in circulation in Maine."21'
In Bagley v. Raymond School Dep't,212 the state supreme court rejected a
state and federal free exercise challenge to a tuition reimbursement program
which excluded religious schools from the receipt of state funds. The court
determined that the plaintiffs, the parents of children enrolled in parochial
schools, were not burdened in the exercise of their religion merely because
the State did not reimburse them for the cost of sending their children to
parochial schools in those school districts where nonsectarian private schools
were eligible for such reimbursement.213 In Bagley, the plaintiffs did not
argue that the Maine Constitution afforded them any greater protection than
the United States Constitution. Accordingly, the state supreme court
addressed their claims "with the understanding that the rights guaranteed by
the United States Constitution and the Maine Constitution are
coextensive."214
In Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland,215 the Maine Supreme
205. Id. at 1380.
206. Id. at 1381-85.
207. Id. at 1384.
208. Id.
209. 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992).
210. Id. at 67.
211. Id.
212. 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999).
213. Id. at 134-35.
214. Id. at 132. The holding in Bagley was reaffirmed in Anderson v. Town of Durham, 895
A.2d 944 (Me. 2006), without discussion of ME. CONST. art 1, § 3.
215. 871 A.2d 1208 (Me. 2005).
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Judicial Court finally clarified that it would continue to apply pre-Smith
analysis to free exercise claims and defenses under article I, section 3.216
Fortin, the court held that a common law action for negligent supervision
could be brought against a religious organization based on tortious acts
committed by a member of the clergy involving a child.217 In so holding, the
court rejected the Catholic Diocese's argument that recognition of such a
cause of action violated article I, section 3. The Diocese "failed to identify a
specific religious activity that [would] be burdened" by allowing the action
to proceed, and its pleadings did not "establish whether, or the extent to
which, the adoption of a duty of care under the circumstances of the present
case [would] restrain the free exercise of the Diocese's activities or
beliefs. . . ."218 Apart from the Diocese's failure to meet its burden under the
first two factors of the Blount analysis, the State has a "compelling interest"
in protecting children from "physical and sexual abuse." 219 The court was
unable to determine whether any less restrictive means could adequately
achieve the State's compelling public interest because "we cannot identify
with any specificity the religious belief burdened by the challenged state
action."20
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has not yet upheld a free exercise
claim or defense based on the pre-Smith standard, but its selection of the strict
scrutiny standard of judicial review suggests that at least some free exercise
claims and defenses that would not prevail under the Supreme Court's test in
Employment Division v. Smith might prevail under article I, section 3.
Maryland
Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides, in part:
[A]ll persons are equally entitled to protection in their religious
liberty; wherefore, no person ought by any law to be molested in his
person or estate, on account of his religious persuasion, or
profession, or for his religious practice, unless, under the color of
religion, he shall disturb the good order, peace or safety of the State,
or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others in their natural,
civil or religious rights. . . . 221
216. Id. at 1227-31 (citing, inter alia, Blount and Rupert).
217. Id at 1215-19.
218. Id. at 1228-29.
219. Id. at 1230.
220. Id.
221. MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 36.
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In Archdiocese of Washington v. Moersen,222 the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that "The Free Exercise Clause, as embodied in the U.S.
Constitution and Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, does not
provide 'a constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of general applicability,'
even when such laws have, as an incidental effect, the burdening of a
particular religious activity. "223 Although "laws targeting particular
religious practices, or selectively imposing burdens on conduct motivated by
religious belief, are subject to strict scrutiny [review], and 'must be justified
by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to
advance that interest," 224 "religious activities may ordinarily be subject to
neutral laws of general applicability."225
The Maryland Court of Appeals' reliance on Employment Division v.
Smith in interpreting the religious freedom guarantee of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights suggests that a free exercise claim or defense that
would not prevail under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
would not likely prevail under article 36, either.
Massachusetts
Part 1, article 2 of the Massachusetts Constitution provides:
It is the right as well as the duty of all men in society, publicly, and
at stated seasons to worship the SUPREME BEING, the great Creator
and Preserver of the universe. And no subject shall be hurt, molested,
or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping GOD
in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own
conscience; or for his religious profession or sentiments; provided he
doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in their religious
worship.226
The first sentence of amendment XLVI (replacing amendment XVIII) of
the Massachusetts Constitution provides, "No law shall be passed prohibiting
the free exercise of religion."227
222. 925 A.2d 659 (Md. 2007).
223. Id. at 661 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 (1997) and citing
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
224. Montrose Christian School Corp. v. Walsh, 770 A.2d Ill, 123 (Md. 2001) (quoting
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993)).
225. Id. (emphasis in original).
226. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 2.
227. Id. amend. XLVI, section 1 (amendment XLVI replaced amendment XVIII). The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refers to amendment XLVI as "art. 46" in its opinions, which
is how it will be cited hereafter.
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The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has observed that part 1,
article 2, protects both religious beliefs (one's "religious profession or
sentiments") and religious practices ("no subject shall be hurt, molested, or
restrained .. .for worshipping GOD in the manner and season most agreeable
to the dictates of his own conscience").22 8 With respect to the former, "this
protection of religious beliefs is substantially absolute. ... "229 With respect
to the latter, which concerns the "manner and season" of worshipping God,
such conduct may involve one or both of the exceptions in article 2, to wit,
"that the conduct must 'not disturb the public peace or obstruct others in their
religious worship."' 230 If neither exception applies, then, by its own terms,
article 2 "gives absolute protection to the manner in which one worships
God" and "[n]o balancing of interests, the worshiper's on the one hand, and
the government's on the other, is called for ....
In Commonwealth v. Nissenbaum, 23 2 the state supreme court held that a
defense to a prosecution for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute
could not be based on article 2. Given its historical understanding, the
exception in article 2 for conduct that "disturb[s] the public peace" was not
limited to breaches of the peace but extended to all criminal offenses,
statutory or common law.233 As a consequence, when a defendant raises
article 2 as a defense in a criminal prosecution, the court must weigh the
State's interest in preventing the crime with which the defendant has been
charged against the burden that the statute may impose on the free exercise
of the defendant's religion.234 In Nissenbaum, the court noted that in cases
decided under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, "the courts
have uniformly determined that the First Amendment does not protect the
possession of controlled substances from the reach of criminal statutes." 235
The court found these cases to be "instructive", and "perceive[d] nothing in
the language or history" of article 2 that suggests that article 2 "affords more
protection in connection with the use of mari|j]uana and hashish than does
228. Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 242 (Mass. 1994).
229. Id.
230. Id. In Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990), the
state supreme court held that the Boston Landmarks Commission could not rely upon either
exception in support of their designation of the interior of a church as a historical landmark, thereby
severely restricting what renovations could be made to the church interior. "[T]he religious conduct
burdened by the State (the reconfiguration of the interior of a church) neither disturbs the public
peace nor obstructs the religious worship of others." Id. at 574. Because "the challenged action fits
neither of the escape provisions in art. 2, and cannot evade the sweep of art. 2's categorical
prohibition against government restraints on religious worship," the landmark designation of the
church interior "unconstitutionally restrains religious worship." Id.
231. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 242.
232. 536 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1989).
233. Id. at 595-96.
234. Id. at 594.
235. Id. (citations omitted).
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the First Amendment." 236 In balancing the competing interests, the court
accepted the legislature's determination that "the possession, distribution,
and cultivation of mari[j]uana and hashish disturb the public order" and held
that such conduct is not protected by article 2, "even if motivated by sincere
religious purpose."237 "We agree with the unanimous precedent that
recognizes both an overriding governmental interest in regulating such
substances and the practical impossibility of doing so and at the same time
accommodating religious freedom." 238 The court concluded that article 2
"does not protect the possession of hashish for sincere religious purposes nor
does it protect the possession of mari[j]uana with intent to distribute it or the
cultivation of mari[j]uana, even for religious purposes."239
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's opinion in Nissenbaum did
not foreclose the possibility that there might be circumstances in which
article 2 "provides protection for religious practices not protected by the First
Amendment, as construed and applied by [fjederal courts," 240 but it has not
recognized any such circumstances to date.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interpreted the free exercise
guarantee of the first sentence of article 46 consistently with the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.24 1 Subsequent to Smith, however,
the state supreme court decided "to adhere to the standards of earlier First
Amendment jurisprudence" in interpreting article 46.242
At issue in Desilets was whether, despite a state statute prohibiting
discrimination on account of marital status, landlords could refuse to lease
one of their apartments to an unmarried couple because, on religious grounds,
they believed that "they should not facilitate sinful conduct, including
fornication."2 43 In an action brought on behalf of the cohabiting couple by the
Commonwealth against the landlords, the superior court granted the
landlords' motion for summary judgment and denied the Attorney General's
motion for summary judgment. The court ruled that the defendant landlords
had violated the anti-discrimination statute, but that application of the statute
to the defendants in the circumstances of the case would be
unconstitutional. 2" The Attorney General appealed.
In evaluating the landlords' article 46 defense to the discrimination
complaint, the state supreme court applied a four-part test. Under that test,
236. Id. at 593, 595.
237. Id. at 596.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 595.
241. Petitions of Goldman, 121 N.E.2d 843, 846 (Mass. 1954).
242. Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 236 (Mass. 1994).
243. Id. at 235.
244. Id.
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[i]n order to gain the exemption [from the application of a legal
requirement], the claimant must show (1) a sincerely held religious
belief, which (2) conflicts with, and thus is burdened by, the state
requirement. Once the claimant has made that showing, the burden
shifts to the state. The state can prevail only by demonstrating both
that (3) the requirement pursues an unusually important [i.e.,
compelling] governmental goal, and that (4) an exemption would
substantially hinder the fulfillment of the goal.245
In Desilets, the court held that the defendant landlords had made the
showing necessary to shift the burden of demonstrating the necessity of the
law to the State. First, "defendants sincerely believe that their behavior must
in all respects conform to their religious beliefs and that, in their view, the
operation of rental housing is not independent of those beliefs."246 Second,
the government has placed a burden on the defendants that makes
their exercise of religion more difficult and more costly. The statute
affirmatively obliges the defendant to enter into a contract contrary
to their religious beliefs and provides significant sanctions for its
violation. Moreover, both their nonconformity to the law and any
related publicity may stigmatize the defendants in the eyes of many
and thus burden the exercise of the defendants' religion.247
The defendants were not barred from advancing a free exercise defense
by the fact that their conduct arose "in a commercial context," which,
"although relevant when engaging in a balancing of interests, does not mean
that their constitutional rights are not substantially burdened."248 The court
emphasized that "[t]his is not a case in which a claimant is seeking a financial
advantage by asserting religious beliefs," and concluded that the defendants'
right to free exercise of religion was "substantially burdened" by application
of the anti-discrimination statute.24 9 The court then turned to an examination
of the record to determine whether "the Commonwealth has or does not have
an important governmental interest that is sufficiently compelling that the
granting of an exemption to people in the position of the defendants would
unduly hinder that goal."250
The state supreme court noted that although article 1 of the
245. Id. at 236-37 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
246. Id.
247. Id at 237-38.
248. Id. at 238.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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Massachusetts Declaration of Rights prohibits discrimination on the basis of
"sex, race, color, creed or national origin," it does not prohibit discrimination
on the basis of marital status.251 Accordingly, "marital status discrimination
is of a lower order than those discriminations to which article 1 refers." 252
Moreover, by statute and judicial decision, "the law has not promoted
cohabitation and has granted a married spouse rights not granted to a man or
woman cohabiting with a member of the opposite sex." 253 In the absence of a
more complete record, the court was "unwilling to conclude that simple
enactment of the prohibition against discrimination based on marital status
establishes that the State has such a substantial interest in eliminating that
form of housing discrimination that, on a balancing test, the substantial
burden on the defendants' free exercise of religion must be disregarded."254
"On the other hand, discrimination of the sort challenged here may present a
significant housing problem if a large percentage of units [in a given area]
are unavailable to cohabitants."255 Because there may have been a genuine
issue of material fact on the strength of the State's interest in eradicating
discrimination based on marital status and whether granting a religious
exemption would substantially hinder achieving that goal, the supreme court
reversed the order granting summary judgment to the defendants and
remanded the cause to the superior court for further proceedings.256 Three
justices dissented, arguing that the order granting summary judgment to the
defendants should have been affirmed.257
In Society of Jesus of New England v. Commonwealth,2 5 8 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court applied the state free exercise test
adopted in Desilets to evaluate a challenge to a subpoena duces tecum issued
by the Commonwealth in a pending criminal prosecution. The defendant in
the case and the religious order to which he belonged (the Jesuits) were able
to demonstrate that "confidentiality in their communications and in their
internal review of priests is based on a religious belief, and that a subpoena
requiring them to divulge those materials would conflict with that belief."259
The court explained:
Their view, supported by logic as well as religious belief, is that
confidentiality helps ensure that a priest will make honest disclosures
to his superiors (as required by the tenets of their religious beliefs)
251. Id. at 239.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 239-40.
254. Id. at 240.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 240-41, 243.
257. Id. at 246-47 (O'Connor, with whom Nolan, and Lynch, JJ., join, dissenting).
258. 808 N.E.2d 272 (Mass. 2004).
259. Id. at 279-80.
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and to his treatment providers (who are in turn keeping the priest's
superiors informed of his treatment program). There can be no
question that confidentiality assists that process, and that depriving
[the defendant priest] and the Jesuits of that confidentiality would
thus conflict with, and burden, the methods chosen to foster and
preserve their relationship within a religious order.260
Under the balancing test set forth in Desilets, the court then turned to the
"countervailing interests asserted by the Commonwealth." 261 The court noted
that the Commonwealth's interest in prosecuting the charges against the
defendant (which included rape, assault with intent to rape and assault and
battery) is "strong," and the crimes "were allegedly committed against high
school students by a person in authority over them at the school." 26 2 "The
Commonwealth's interest in preventing sexual abuse of students ranks as
exceptionally high." 263 Although the defendant and his religious order did not
dispute the strength of that interest, they suggested that "production of
documents from religious organizations" was not necessary "in pursuit of the
Commonwealth's law enforcement goals" and that, instead, the
Commonwealth should rely upon "good police work" to secure convictions
in criminal cases.26 The supreme court rejected this argument, noting that,
while the defendant had not made "any statement or confession to the police,"
the subpoenaed documents might contain "damaging admissions" by the
defendant, which would be useful "not solely for purposes of persuading a
jury to convict," but could also lead to "plea negotiations, with the potential
that two young victims of sexual abuse might be spared the ordeal of
testifying at trial."2 65 Because "the Commonwealth has a compelling interest
in obtaining [the subpoenaed] documents" and "there are no other avenues
by which the Commonwealth could obtain the equivalent of these
documents," "those interests outweigh the claimed interest of keeping these
communications confidential."266
In Rasheed v. Comm'r of Corrections,267 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court again applied the analysis in Desilets to claims by a prison
inmate who belonged to the Nation of Islam (a subsect of the Muslim faith)
260. Id. at 280.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 281.
263. Id
264. Id.
265. Id. at 281-82.
266. Id at 282. Not before the supreme court were any issues regarding whether any of the
defendant's communications were protected by either the statutory "priest-penitent" privilege or the
statutory psychotherapy privilege. Id. at 282 n. 13.
267. 845 N.E.2d 296 (Mass. 2006).
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alleging deprivation of religious liberty under the state constitution.268 The
superior court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all of the
plaintiff's claims.
On appeal, the state supreme court determined that most of the inmate's
claims were insubstantial and did not require any justification by the prison
authorities. 269 The superior court's order granting defendants' motion for
summary judgment was affirmed with respect to those claims.270
Significantly, the court stated that a burden on the free exercise of religion
cannot be considered to be "substantial," and thereby require a compelling
justification, unless the burden in question has the tendency "to coerce an
individual into acting contrary to [his] religious beliefs. . . ."271 It is not
enough to show that the "incidental effects" of a government policy or
program "may make it more difficult to practice [one's] religion. . . ."27
In Rasheed, the court did determine that the inmate's complaint that he
was denied access to "Islamic festival meals" prevented him "from acquiring
the food that he believes he must consume to comply with his faith," which
"has the tendency to coerce him to eat [food] that does not [comply with his
faith]."273 Although the correctional facility had strong reasons for limiting
the number of vendors who provided food to the facility, specifically, "to
control food quality better, increase efficiencies, ensure a consistent food
supply, reduce burdens on staff required to process and search incoming food
items, and reduce opportunities for contraband to be introduced into prisons
through such items,"274 the record did not reflect whether the foods the inmate
wanted were available from the facility's principal vendor.275 For that reason,
the court reversed the superior court's order granting summary judgment to
the defendants on that claim and remanded the case for further proceedings.2 76
As the foregoing decisions illustrate, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court does not follow the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division
268. Section 4 of article 46 provides that inmates of publicly controlled penal institutions are
not to be deprived of the "opportunity of religious exercises therein of [their] own faith." MASS.
CONST. amend. XLVI, section 4. Article 46, together with article 2 of the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights, were intended to guarantee "the free exercise of religion by every citizen, especially
protecting the religious liberty of the inmates of penal and charitable institutions." R.L. Bridgman,
MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1917 34 (1923) (statement of the committee
on the Declaration of Rights in support of the adoption of article 46).
269. Rasheed, 845 N.E.2d at 306-07 (discussing the inmate's requests to use a certain brand of
shaving powder, to keep a "foot pan" in his cell, to have a "prayer rug" rather than a "prayer towel"
in his cell, to have access to a larger variety and quantity of "prayer oil," and to be excused from
having to stand during the four brief daily prison counts).
270. Id. at 310.
271. Id. at 306 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
272. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
273. Id. at 307.
274. Id. at 304.
275. Id. at 308.
276. Id. at 310.
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v. Smith in evaluating free exercise of religion claims and defenses raised
under article 46 of the Massachusetts Constitution. Whether the state
supreme court will give article 2 of the state constitution a broader reading
than the federal Free Exercise Clause remains to be decided, but may not be
of any importance given the court's interpretation of article 46.
Michigan
Article I, section 4, of the Michigan Constitution provides:
Every person shall be at liberty to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience. No person shall be compelled to
attend, or against his consent, to contribute to the erection or support
of any place of religious worship, or to pay tithes, taxes or other rates
for the support of any minister of the gospel or teacher of religion.
No money shall be appropriated or drawn from the treasury for the
benefit of any religious sect or society, theological or religious
seminary; nor shall property belonging to the state be appropriated
for any such purpose. The civil and political rights, privileges and
capacities of no person shall be diminished or enlarged on account
of his religious belief.277
"Taken together," the Michigan Supreme Court has explained, "these
sentences are an expanded and more explicit statement of the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the first and fourth sentences constituting the Free Exercise
Clause, and the second and third sentences constituting the Establishment
Clause."278 "They are," accordingly, "subject to similar interpretation. "279
There is no indication in Michigan case law that the Michigan Supreme
Court would not follow Supreme Court precedent interpreting the
Establishment Clause in the second and third sentences of article I, section
4.280 However, in interpreting the first and fourth sentences of section 4, the
Michigan Supreme Court does not follow Supreme Court precedent
interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, as set forth in Employment Division v.
Smith. The test to evaluate religious freedom claims under section 4 has five
277. MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
278. Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1970 Pa. 100, 180 N.W.2d 265, 274 (Mich.
1970).
279. Id.
280. See, e.g., Scalise v. Boy Scouts of America, 692 N.W.2d 858, 868 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005)
(citing Advisory Opinion supra note 278, at 274); American Atheists, Inc. v. City of Detroit
Downtown Development Authority, 503 F. Supp. 2d 845, 854 n.8 (E.D. Mich. 2007), aff'd, 567
F.3d 278, 301 (6th Cir. 2009) (following Scalise).
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elements:
(1) whether a defendant's belief, or conduct motivated by belief, is
sincerely held; (2) whether a defendant's belief, or conduct
motivated by belief, is religious in nature; (3) whether a state
regulation imposes a burden on the exercise of such belief or
conduct; (4) whether a compelling state interest justifies the burden
imposed upon a defendant's belief or conduct; and (5) whether there
is a less obtrusive form of regulation available to the state.28'
A burden may be shown, the supreme court explained, if the "affected
individuals [would] be coerced by the Government's action into violating
their religious beliefs [or if] governmental action [would] penalize religious
activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and
privileges enjoyed by other citizens."282 Hence, "'[a] claimed burden on
religious beliefs may be deemed constitutionally insignificant, but only (1) if
the claimant's beliefs do not create an irreconcilable conflict between the
mandates of law and religious duty, or (2) if the legal requirement does not
directly coerce the claimant to act contrary to religious belief . . "283 Thus,
if the conduct prohibited by a statute or policy is not fundamental to the
practice of one's religion, then the statute or policy is not subject to strict
scrutiny review and may be upheld if it is reasonably related to a legitimate
state interest. For example, attending Muslim prayer services on Friday is not
a fundamental tenet of Islam.284 Nor is participating in extracurricular
interscholastic athletic events a fundamental tenet of Christianity.285 On the
other hand, in DeJonge, the Michigan Supreme Court held that parents who
home schooled their children in order to provide them with a "Christ centered
education" could not be forced to comply with the requirement that all
teachers, including parents who home schooled their children, be certified by
the State.286 The certification requirement was not, in itself, a compelling state
interest, nor was it "essential" to the State's interest in ensuring that the "aims
of compulsory education" be met.287
Finally, in Champion v. Secretary of State,288 the Michigan Court of
Appeals held that a person could not refuse, on the basis of the freedom of
281. McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Mich. 1998), vacated in part, 593 N.W.2d
545 (Mich. 1999).
282. People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 136 (Mich. 1993) (quoting Dep't of Social Services
v. Emmanuel Baptist Preschool 434 Mich. 380, 393 (1990)).
283. Id. at 136 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
284. Abdur-Ra'oof v. Dep't of Corr., 562 N.W.2d 251 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
285. Reid v. Kenowa Hills Public Schools, 680 N.W.2d 62 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
286. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d at 140.
287. Id. at 137-44.
288. 761 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008).
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religion guarantees of article I, section 4, to provide his social security
number as a condition precedent to being able to renew his driver's license.
Acknowledging that the plaintiff had satisfied the first two elements of the
five-part test set forth in McCready v. Hofflus,289 the court determined that
the State had satisfied its burden under the last two elements of the test (the
court did not address the third element- whether the requirement that the
plaintiff disclose his social security number imposed a burden on him in the
exercise of his religious beliefs and related conduct).290
The requirement that an applicant for a driver's license (or its renewal)
provide his social security number is intended to facilitate enforcement of
child support obligations. The court of appeals held that "there is a strong and
compelling state interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of children
relative to their financial health, which affects their overall well-being, by
means of child support legislation."29' Such legislation includes "enactments
providing for court filiation and support orders, support enforcement and
collection mechanisms, and other provisions securing the support of
children."292 More narrowly defined, "the government has a compelling
interest in the establishment of paternity, the tracking and locating of parents
legally obligated to pay child support, the enforcement of support obligations,
and the collection of support payments, and doing so in a timely fashion," as
well as having in place "a data-collection mechanism and network to assist
in locating individuals, establishing paternity, and enforcing support
obligations with respect to future births and parental responsibilities."293
Requiring applicants for driver's licenses to furnish their social security
numbers
greatly assists in promoting these interests, and thus helps to
successfully accomplish the broad compelling interest ... of
providing for the welfare of children, where a social security number
can be used as an important and practical tool to collect necessary
information and data for support and paternity purposes.294
Because a social security number is a "unique federal identifier that can
be effectively utilized to locate absent parents and withhold wages, all in the
name of supporting children," the court concluded that "there are no less
restrictive or obtrusive means available to promote the compelling state
289. McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Mich. 1998), vacated in part, 593 N.W.2d
545 (Mich. 1999).
290. Champion, 761 N.W.2d at 753-58.
291. Id. at 754.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 755.
294. Id.
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interests at stake here and that the reporting of social security numbers on
license applications is essential to accomplishing these interests." 295
Moreover, "[g]ranting exemptions for plaintiff and other religious objectors
would defeat the goals and interests sought to be promoted by the
legislation." 296 The plaintiffs claim for an exemption from the requirement
under article I, section 4, was therefore rejected.
Minnesota
Article I, section 16, of the Minnesota Constitution provides, in part:
The right of every man to worship God according to the dictates of
his own conscience shall never be infringed; ... nor shall any control
of or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, ... but
the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as
to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with
the peace or safety of the state. ...
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith,
the Minnesota Supreme Court generally applied First Amendment free
exercise analysis to "liberty of conscience" claims and defenses raised under
article I, section 16.298 Subsequent to Smith, however, the state supreme court
began to interpret section 16 independently of federal free exercise analysis.
In State by Cooper v. French,299 a plurality of the court declined to follow
the recently decided Smith case in evaluating a landlord's article I, section 16
defense to a charge of housing discrimination involving a cohabiting
couple.300 Given the prominence and history of religious liberty in Minnesota,
section 16 imposes "a more stringent burden on the state" than is required by
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.30 ' The "plain language" of
section 16 "commands this court to weigh the competing interests at stake
295. Id. at 755-56.
296. Id. at 756.
297. MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
298. See, e.g., In re State of Minnesota by McClure v. Sports and Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d
844, 853 (Minn. 1985) (holding that application of anti-discrimination provisions of state human
rights act did not violate the state or federal free exercise rights of the club or its owners because
"the government has an overriding compelling interest in prohibiting discrimination in employment
and public accommodation" that "could be substantially frustrated if employers . . . could
discriminate against the protected classes" on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs).
299. 460 N.W.2d2 (Minn. 1990).
300. A majority of the court determined that the landlord had not violated the anti-
discrimination statute. Id. at 4-8.
301. Id. at 9.
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whenever rights of conscience are burdened."302 Under section 16, "the state
may interfere with the rights of conscience only if it can show that the
religious practice in question is 'licentious' or 'inconsistent with the peace or
safety of the state."'30 3 Because the State did not make such a showing,3" the
landlord's defense to the anti-discrimination charge had to be sustained even
if the human rights act applied to conduct in refusing to rent his house to a
cohabiting couple.30 s
In a case decided later in 1990, a majority of the Minnesota Supreme
Court agreed that article I, section 16, provides greater protection to "rights
of conscience" than does the federal Free Exercise Clause, as interpreted in
Employment Division v. Smith. In State v. Hershberger,306 the state supreme
court considered a challenge by members of the Old Order Amish religious
community to a statute requiring operators of slow-moving vehicles (which
would include the horse-drawn buggies driven by the Amish) to display a
fluorescent triangular "slow-moving vehicle" ("SMV") symbol on their
vehicles. On religious grounds, the Amish objected to the display of the SMV
symbol.
The supreme court noted that the language of article I, section 16, is "of
a distinctly stronger character than the federal counterpart," and stated that it
precludes not only "prohibiting the exercise of religion," but also "even an
infringement on or an interference with religious freedom."307 "Accordingly,
government actions that may not constitute an outright prohibition on
religious practices (thus not violating the first amendment) could nonetheless
infringe on or interfere with those practices," thereby violating article I,
section 16.30s Moreover, unlike the federal Free Exercise Clause, section 16
"expressly limits the governmental interests that may outweigh religious
liberty" to "'practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state,"' or
"'acts of licentiousness."'309 But even where one of those interests exists, it
must be balanced against the freedom of conscience conferred by section 16.
Thus, when a question of public safety is presented, "once a claimant has
demonstrated a sincere religious belief intended to be protected by section
16, the state should be required to demonstrate that public safety cannot be
achieved by proposed alternative means."3"o "Specifically, if freedom of
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. In the plurality's view, this would have been a formidable task, given that fornication was
a criminal offense. The author of the opinion asked: "How can there be a compelling state interest
in promoting fornication when there is a state statute on the books prohibiting it?" Id. at 10.
305. Id.at9-ll.
306. 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
307. Id. at 397 (emphases in original).
308. Id.
309. Id. (quoting MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 16).
310. Id. at 398.
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conscience and public safety can be achieved through use of an alternative to
a statutory requirement that burdens freedom of conscience, in this case the
SMV symbol, section 16 requires an allowance for such alternative.""' On
the basis of the record presented, the State had failed to demonstrate that the
alternative proposed by the Amish, "use of reflective tape and a lighted red
lantern," would provide "an insufficient warning to other drivers."3 12
Accordingly, the order of the trial court denying the defendant Amish their
motion to dismiss the pending charges was vacated and the charges were
dismissed."'
In Hill-Murray Federation of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High School,3 14
the Minnesota Supreme Court restated the test for evaluating freedom of
conscience claims and defenses under article I, section 16. That test, the court
explained, "has four prongs: whether the objector's belief is sincerely held;
whether the state regulation burdens the exercise of religious beliefs; whether
the state interest in the regulation is overriding or compelling; and whether
the state regulation uses the least restrictive means.""' At issue in Hill-
Murray was whether, pursuant to state labor law, a union could organize and
represent the lay employees of a Catholic high school. The court
acknowledged that the school had a sincerely held religious belief, objecting
to the State interfering with its authority as an employer through application
of the labor laws that created a mechanism for recognizing a bargaining agent
for its employees.316 The court, however, determined that allowing a union to
represent the lay employees of the school would not "excessively burden [the
school's] religious beliefs."" This determination was based on the court's
holding that "matters of religious doctrine and practice at a religiously
affiliated school are intrinsically inherent matters of managerial policy and
therefore nonnegotiable" under the State's labor laws."' Although normal
"terms and conditions of employment," such as those relating to hours of
employment, compensation and personnel policies affecting working
conditions would be negotiable, the school would retain the power "to hire
employees who meet their religious expectations, to require compliance with
religious doctrine, and to remove any person who fails to follow the religious
standards set forth" by the school.'19
In Hill-Murray, the court also considered the third and fourth prongs of
its test. The court determined that the State had "overriding and compelling"
311. Id. at 399.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. 487 N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 1992).
315. Id. at 865 (citing, inter alia, Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393).
316. Id. at 865-66.
317. Id. at 866.
318. Id.
319. Id.
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interests in "promoting the peace and safety of industrial relations, the
recognition of the statutory guarantees of collective association and
bargaining, and the first amendment protection of the right of association." 320
Finally, the court held that the school's proposal for a "less restrictive
alternative" to recognition of a bargaining agent, a "voluntary grievance
procedure," was unacceptable because it would not "effectuate the strength
of collective action" that "allows the individual 'David' to negotiate against
the employer 'Goliath."'
32 1
In Odenthal v. Minnesota Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,322 the
Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether a member of a church could
bring a negligence action against a minister of the church and the church
conference, alleging that the minister had engaged in improprieties in
counseling the member's wife. The state supreme court held that adjudicating
the member's negligence claim against the minister, based upon neutral
standards of conduct set forth in the statutes governing the conduct of
unlicensed mental health practitioners, violated neither the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment nor the "rights of conscience" protected by article I,
section 16.323 With respect to the latter issue, the Supreme Court applied the
four-pronged test it had developed in Hill-Murray. The court assumed that
the defendants had a "sincerely held religious belief," but held that the
exercise of their religious beliefs was not impermissibly burdened by state
standards "regulating unlicensed mental health professionals" where those
standards merely "establish a floor of acceptable conduct for mental health
professionals," but "allow[] for incorporation of spiritual or religious aspects
to the treatment or counseling."324 The court held further that, "[g]iven the
frequently vulnerable nature of those receiving mental health services, the
state's interest in their safety and well-being is compelling."325 Finally, the
court held that the statute "appears to be tailored in a non-restrictive manner"
because it "regulates only conduct that meets the definition of mental health
services," and not "any spiritual advice or guidance from a clergy
member... ."326
Article I, section 16, has also been discussed in many decisions of the
Minnesota Court of Appeals. Most of the claims or defenses based on section
16 have been rejected. In Black v. Snyder,327 the court of appeals held that
article 1, section 16 did not bar a sexual harassment claim brought by a former
associate pastor against her church. In a brief discussion of section 16, the
320. Id. at 867.
321. Id.
322. 649 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 2002).
323. Id. at 434-43.
324. Id. at 442.
325. Id. at 443.
326. Id.
327. 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
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court stated that to allow such a claim to proceed would not burden the
church's religious practices, "in light of the church's own policy against such
conduct."328 Even on the assumption that the state statute prohibiting sexual
harassment would "incidentally burden religious activity or belief," the
plaintiff was entitled to assert her claim because the State has a "compelling"
interest "in eradicating sexual harassment in the work place," and "no
adequate, less restrictive alternative to enforcement" is available.329
In Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis,o the court of
appeals held that article I, section 16, did not bar an award of punitive
damages against a church based on the sexual abuse of a child by a priest
because the church's actions in repeatedly placing an abusive priest in
parishes without restriction "arguably condoned acts of licentious behavior
and justified practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state"
within the meaning of the exclusion in section 16 for such acts and
practices.33'
In State v. Pedersen,332 the court of appeals held that the defendant had
failed to demonstrate that she had a "sincerely held religious belief in the
medicinal use of marijuana," and, therefore, failed to meet the threshold
requirement of a valid religious freedom claim or defense under section 16.33
In State v. Schwartz,334 the defendant had been convicted of two counts of
second-degree sexual conduct and had been placed on probation with the
condition that he be admitted to and successfully complete a sex-offender
treatment program. No such treatment program would accept the defendant,
however, because he refused to admit that he had committed the offenses of
which he had been found guilty.3 In a proceeding to revoke his probation,
the defendant sought to invoke section 16 as a defense, in that he could not
be required to "lie" as a condition of being admitted to a treatment program. 33 6
The court of appeals rejected his defense. There was no evidence that the
defendant's refusal to "lie" (by admitting his guilt) was grounded in any
principles of general morality, much less any religious belief, but appeared
to be more of a "pragmatic, cost-benefit principle" that telling the truth was
a better way of "stay[ing] out of trouble."
In Shagalow v. State ofMinnesota, Dep't ofHuman Services, 338 the court
328. Id. at 721.
329. Id.
330. 482 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
331. Id. at 812.
332. 679 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
333. Id. at 372-77.
334. 598 N.W.2d 7 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
335. Id. at 9.
336. Id. at 9-10.
337. Id. at 10.
338. 725 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
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of appeals considered a claim by a mildly retarded Jewish Orthodox woman,
who was Medicaid-eligible, that she was entitled to "habilitation" services in
Jerusalem, Israel,339 because no such services, consistent with her Orthodox
faith, requiring "gender segregation, strict observance of the Sabbath, and
food preparation and consumption," was available in Minnesota.340 The court
held that the Department of Human Services' ("DHS") refusal to fund
habilitation services in Israel did not deny the plaintiff her rights under article
I, section 16.341 Under the second prong of the Hill-Murray test, the State's
refusal to pay for habilitation services in Israel did not force the applicant "to
choose between criminal sanctions and her free exercise of religion," "does
not penalize her by reducing her ... benefits," "does not prohibit her exercise
of religion," and "does not directly infringe on her religious autonomy or
require conduct inconsistent with her religious beliefs," and the "indirect
effect on religion [by making it more expensive for her to attend the
residential facility in Jerusalem] is not motivated by an intent to affect
religious practices and is not unique to religion."342
In applying the third and fourth prongs of the Hill-Murray test, the court
also determined that the State had a compelling interest "in protecting
mentally or physically vulnerable persons," and that no less restrictive means
(other than not funding the out-of-country services) would enable the State
"to monitor the quality of. .. services, to ensure [that] services are provided
in a safe and healthy environment, and to investigate reports related to the
vulnerability of recipients or misuse of public funds."343 To require the State
to provide the applicant with habilitation services in Israel "would create
untold complexities.""
Others seeking benefits at remote locations would claim
discrimination if their requests were rejected. Of necessity, DHS
would become involved with evaluating the character of the parents,
programs in distant parts of the world, and ad hoc monitoring
arrangements. Stating [applicant's] dramatic demand reveals its
weakness: unless DHS pays for enrollment in a faith-based program
in Israel, it violates her religious freedom. The location is the subject
of recurring military conflict half way around the world. If the state
must make this accommodation, it is hard to imagine an
339. Habilitation services "assist persons to develop skills to live in society." Id. at 383.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 389-92.
342. Id. at 391. In fact, the applicant had developed an alternative plan, which was approved
for payment by the State that included payment "for day and evening staff, an eight-week summer
camp, music lessons, and adaptive sports lessons." Id. at 389 n.2.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 392.
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accommodation that would not be constitutionally mandated.345
The court concluded that the State's decision not to authorize payment
for habilitation services in Israel did not violate the applicant's rights under
article I, section 16, of the Minnesota Constitution.34 6
In a few cases, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld claims or defenses
based on article I, section 16. In In the Matter of the Welfare of T.K. and
WK., Children,347 the court of appeals held that the removal of minor children
from the custody and care of their parents because of the parents' refusal on
religious grounds to allow them to attend public school and/or to take
standardized, norm-referenced achievement examinations was "premature"
and not the "least restrictive alternative" in promoting the State's compelling
interest in an educated citizenry.3 48 The court pointed out that "additional
statutory remedies" were available "to determine whether [the parents] were
providing an adequate home school education for their children."3 49 In a coda
to its opinion, the court cautioned that "[t]hese children should not be put in
a position where they can only receive an acceptable education outside their
parental home or, alternatively, only remain at home by sacrificing the
opportunity to receive an education. They deserve both an education and a
nurturing, loving parental home."350
In Rasmussen v. Glass,"' the court of appeals held that a municipal civil
rights commission had improperly imposed a civil sanction against a
restaurant and the restaurant's owner who, for reasons of "moral conscience,"
had refused to deliver food to an abortion clinic.352 Even assuming that the
owner's refusal fell within the scope of the ordinance, enforcement of the
ordinance against the owner and his restaurant would violate article I, section
16. Under the ordinance, the restaurant owner was faced with the choice of
either "associat[ing] with an entity that engages in conduct which he finds to
be morally offensive, thus compromising his conscience, or he can refuse and
be found guilty of discrimination and be fined."" The City of Minneapolis
did not have a "compelling or overriding interest" in the enforcement of its
anti-discrimination ordinance where the restaurant owner's conduct did not
create a threat "to either peace or safety," nor did it constitute an act of
"licentiousness."35 4 Accordingly, the commission's finding that the restaurant
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. 475 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
348. Id. at 93.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 94.
351. 498 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
352. Id. at 514-16.
353. Id. at 515-16.
354. Id. at 516 (citing State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990) (restricting the
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and its owner had violated the anti-discrimination ordinance was reversed
and the fine rescinded. 355
Mississippi
Article III, section 18, of the Mississippi Constitution provides, in part,
"the free enjoyment of all religious sentiments and the different modes of
worship shall be held sacred. The rights hereby secured shall not be construed
to justify acts of licentiousness injurious to morals or dangerous to the peace
and safety of the state. . . .""6 In Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church,"' the
Mississippi Supreme Court, citing Employment Division v. Smith,
characterized article III, section 18, as "a counterpart to the First
Amendment.""' The state supreme court's characterization of article III,
section 18, and its reliance upon Smith suggest that it would not likely give
the state's guarantee of religious rights any broader reading than the Supreme
Court has given the Free Exercise Clause, but, given the paucity of case law
on the matter, that conclusion is not entirely free of doubt.
Missouri
Article I, section 5, of the Missouri Constitution provides, in part:
That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences;
that no human authority can control or interfere with the rights of
conscience; ... but this section shall not be construed to excuse acts
of licentiousness, nor to justify practices inconsistent with the good
order, peace or safety of the state, or with the rights of others.359
reasons for which religious liberty may be limited to "acts of licentiousness" and "practices
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state").
355. Id.
356. MiSS. CONST. art. Ill, § 18.
357. 884 So.2d 747 (Miss. 2004).
358. Id. at 754.
359. MO. CONST. art. I, § 5. In 2012, article 1, section 5, was substantially amended to include
language protecting voluntary individual and corporate prayer in public or private settings "so long
as such prayer does not result in disturbance of the peace or disruption of a public meeting or
assembly," permitting voluntary prayer on "government premises and public property" on the same
terms as other free speech would be allowed under similar circumstances, conferring upon students
the right to express their religious beliefs in their course work "free from discrimination based on
the religious content of their work," and prohibiting students from being compelled "to perform or
participate in academic assignments or educational presentations that violate his or her religious
beliefs." Id.
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Article 1, section 7, provides, in part, that "no preferences shall be given
to, nor any discrimination made against any church, sect or creed of religion,
or any form of religious faith or worship."3 60
Apart from school aid issues,36 1 the religion clauses of the Missouri
Constitution have generally been construed in a manner similar to that of the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.3 62
Nevertheless, the Missouri reviewing courts have not yet decided whether
"Missouri would adopt the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Free Exercise Clause in [City of] Boerne [v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997),
which reaffirmed Employment Division v. Smith] in interpreting the Missouri
Constitution's free exercise provision. . . ."" As a result, it cannot be
determined whether the Missouri Supreme Court would follow Employment
Division v. Smith in evaluating claims and defenses under article I, section 5.
Montana
Article II, section 5, of the Montana Constitution provides "The state
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof."3" In a trio of post-Employment Division v. Smith
decisions, the Montana Supreme Court has rejected free exercise claims
brought under both article II, section 5, and the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment, using the same analysis to dispose of both the state and
federal constitutional claims.
In Valley Christian School v. Montana High School Ass'n,3" the state
supreme court considered the constitutionality of a state high school
association bylaw that prohibited unaccredited schools from participating in
tournaments or activities with two or more other schools. In order to be
accredited by the state, all of the teachers had to be certified by the Office of
Public Instruction.366 When a private religious school hired a teacher who was
360. Id. art. 1, § 7.
361. See Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97, 101-02 (Mo. 1974) (noting, with reference to school
aid issues, that "the provisions of the Missouri Constitution declaring that there shall be a separation
of church and state are not only more explicit but more restrictive than the Establishment Clause [of
the First Amendment] of the United States Constitution"). See also Oliver v. State Tax Comm'n of
Missouri, 37 S.W.3d 243, 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (identifying "the focus on prohibiting state
resources to the promotion of religion [in the first clause of art. I, § 7]" as "[o]ne point of difference
in particularity with the United States Constitution").
362. See Boone v. State, 147 S.W.3d 801, 805-06 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding state sexual
offender registration program); Oliver, 37 S.W.3d at 247-52 (upholding requirement that state tax
returns be signed under oath or affirmation); Clayton by Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 381 (8th
Cir. 1989) (construing Establishment Clause and article 1, section 7, together).
363. State v. Pride, I S.W.3d 494, 507 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
364. MONT. CONST. art. 11, § 5.
365. 86 P.3d 554 (Mont. 2004).
366. Id. at 555.
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not certified by the state because he was deemed morally unfit for the
profession due to a prior conviction for cruelty to animals, the school lost its
state accreditation and the right to compete in certain interscholastic
competitions. 67 The school, certain students enrolled in the school, and their
parents, sued the state high school association, alleging that its "free exercise
of religion" was being infringed upon in violation of article II, section 5, and
the Free Exercise Clause.3 68 The supreme court affirmed the district court's
denial of preliminary injunctive relief.
Quoting from the Supreme Court's decision in Thomas v. Review Board
ofthe Indiana Employment Security Division,369 the Montana Supreme Court
stated that "a burden upon religion" is created "' [w]here the state conditions
receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith,
or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious
belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his
behavior and to violate his beliefs. . . ."'0 The state high school association
bylaw did neither. The requirement for membership in the association that all
teachers be certified by the state was not "proscribed by religious faith," as
evidenced by the fact that the school had been a member of the association
for fifteen years, nor was the hiring of uncertified teachers "mandated by
religious belief.""' Even though the bylaw arguably "limit[ed] [the school's]
pool of potential teacher candidates and thereby makes it more difficult for
[the school] to offer a Christian education," it "[did] not have a tendency to
coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs."372 Under the
Free Exercise Clause, the "incidental effects of government programs which
may make it more difficult to practice certain religions, but which have no
tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs,"
need not be justified by a compelling interest.
In Cape v. Crossroads Correctional Center,374 the state supreme court
considered claims by a Catholic prison inmate that the correctional facility in
which he had been incarcerated had violated his First Amendment right to
freedom of religion by failing to provide him with "religious meals" during
Lent and by denying him the ability to observe Lent by eating fish and
unleavened bread on Ash Wednesday and all Fridays during Lent.7 The
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the inmate's claims
367. Id.
368. Id. at 555-56.
369. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
370. Valley Christian School, 86 P.3d at 556 (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18).
371. Id. at 557.
372. Id.
373. Id. (citing Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-51
(1988).
374. 99 P.3d 171 (Mont. 2004).
375. Id. at 174.
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in an opinion which construed together both the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment and article II, section 5 of the Montana Constitution. 376
In order to be protected as a constitutional right, the court explained, "a
dietary request must be essential to the practice of a particular religion."7
The inmate, however, "failed to allege that his dietary requests of fish and
unleavened bread are essential requirements of a Catholic's diet during
Lent."" The correctional facility presented affidavits from the Catholic
chaplain for both the Montana State Prison and the Montana State Hospital
and the warden of the Crossroads Correctional Center. The chaplain stated,
"the Catholic religion does not require fish to be consumed on days of
abstinence from red meat," nor are Catholics "required to consume
unleavened bread during Lent." 7 ' The warden stated that the facility had
implemented a program where "meatless meals are provided to Catholic
inmates on Ash Wednesday, Good Friday, and all Fridays during Lent.""o
According to the chaplain, "a vegetarian diet is acceptable," and the new meal
program "does comply with the requirements of the Catholic faith.""' The
inmate presented no evidence to contradict either the chaplain's statements
or the warden's.382 Because the inmate's "minimal general allegations" did
not establish a claim upon which relief could be granted, the supreme court
affirmed the dismissal of his claims.
In Griffith v. Butte School District No. 1,384 the State Supreme Court
considered a former public high school student's claim that her high school
violated her state and federal rights under article II, section 5, and the Free
Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment when it refused
to allow her to deliver a valedictory speech which contained references to
God and Jesus Christ. Although the Supreme Court accepted the student's
free speech claim, it rejected her free exercise claim, relying upon its analysis
in Valley Christian School v. Montana High School Ass'n.
In evaluating the student's free exercise claim, the court stated that the
issue was whether the student's intended conduct (to express her personal
religious views in her valedictory speech) was "'proscribed by a religious
faith' or 'mandated by a religious belief.'"'3 Nothing in the record, however,
"indicates either that [the student's] religious faith mandates [that] she
376. Id. at 175.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 175-76.
379. Id. at 175.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 175-76
383. Id. at 176.
384. 244 P.3d 321 (Mont. 2010).
385. Id. at 336 (quoting Valley Christian School v. Montana High School Ass'n, 86 P.3d 554
(Mont. 2004)).
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include personal religious expressions in a speech or that her faith proscribes
delivering a speech devoid of personal expression."386 Moreover, "[her]
personal belief that she could not speak without mention of God and Christ
during her speech is not equivalent to a mandate by her religious faith that
she do so."38 Because the student could not demonstrate that the school
district's request that she omit references to "God" and "Christ" from her
speech was incompatible with the tenets of her religious faith, her
constitutional right to freedom of religion was not violated."'
The Montana Supreme Court's decisions in Valley Christian School,
Cape, and Griffith all purported to equate state and federal free exercise
analysis and reached a result in each case which is consistent with current
Supreme Court free exercise jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the state supreme
court has not yet had occasion to apply Employment Division v. Smith to an
otherwise valid and neutral law of general applicability that proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that a person's religion prescribes (or proscribes).
Whether such a law would withstand review under article II, section 5, thus
remains undetermined.
Nebraska
Article I, section 4, of the Nebraska Constitution provides, in part, "All
persons have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own consciences. . . . [N]or shall any
interference with the rights of conscience be permitted."389 The Nebraska
Supreme Court has held that the rights secured by article I, section 4, are no
broader than those secured by the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment.390 Because of this equivalency of interpretation, a claim or
defense that would not prevail under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment would not prevail under article I, section 4, either.
Nevada
Article 1, section 4, of the Nevada Constitution provides, in part, "The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without
discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed in this State . . . ."39




389. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4.
390. In re Interest of Anaya, 758 N.W.2d 10, 17-20 (Neb. 2008).
391. NEV. CONST. art. 1, §4.
392. Wilson v. State, 468 P.2d 346 (Nev. 1970).
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interpreting article 1, section 4,393 and that single case sheds no light on the
meaning of the state free exercise guarantee. Until the Nevada Supreme Court
has occasion to consider a post-Smith state free exercise claim or defense, it
cannot be determined whether article 1, section 4, has any significance
independent of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
New Hampshire
Part I, Article 5, of the New Hampshire Constitution provides:
Every individual has a natural and unalienable right to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and reason; and no
subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty,
or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and reason most
agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious
profession, sentiments, or persuasion; provided he doth not disturb
the public peace or disturb others in their religious worship.39 4
In State v. Perfetto," the New Hampshire Supreme Court, in interpreting
part I, article 5, applied the Supreme Court's decision in Employment
Division v. Smith. The state supreme court held that a person convicted of
multiple counts of possession of child pornography could be prohibited from
attending church services at which children would be present.396 in an earlier
case, the court also relied upon Smith in rejecting a defense based on part I,
article 5, in a professional disciplinary proceeding. 97 In Petition ofSmith, the
court held, "the holder of a license [to practice medicine] cannot rely on her
religious views to excuse failures to comply with state medical licensing
requirements." 39 8
In light of the New Hampshire Supreme Court's reliance upon Smith in
interpreting part I, article 5, of the New Hampshire Constitution, a claim or
defense that would not prevail under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment would not likely prevail under part I, article 5, either.
393. In Blandino v. State, 914 P.2d 624 (Nev. 1996), the Nevada Supreme Court held, without
discussion of article 1, section 4, that a criminal defendant has no First Amendment free exercise
right to represent himself on appeal.
394. N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 5.
395. 7 A.3d 1179 (N.H. 2010).
396. Id. at 1181-83.
397. Petition of Smith, 652 A.2d 154 (N.H. 1994).
398. Id. at 160-61.
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New Jersey
Article I, section 3, of the New Jersey Constitution provides, in part, "No
person shall be deprived of the inestimable privilege of worshipping
Almighty God in a manner agreeable to the dictates of his own
conscience. . . .,"3 There is relatively little case law interpreting article I,
section 3. The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, has noted that the state
constitution "contains no reference to the 'free exercise' of religion," 40 0 and
has held that the state constitutional prohibition of establishment of religion40 '
is no broader in scope than the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.402 Without discussing article I, section 3, the Appellate Division
has applied Smith in rejecting a free exercise claim.403
The lack of any independent analysis under article I, section 3, the New
Jersey Supreme Court's acknowledgment that the state constitution does not
include a free exercise guarantee, and the New Jersey courts' frequent
citation of and reliance upon Employment Division v. Smith in evaluating
federal free exercise claims all tend to suggest that a claim or defense that
would not prevail under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
would not prevail under article I, section 3, either.
New Mexico
Article II, section 11, of the New Mexico Constitution provides, in part,
"Every man shall be free to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and no person shall ever be molested or denied any civil or
political right or privilege on account of his religious opinion or mode of
religious worship.""t In Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock,405 the New
Mexico Court of Appeals applied the analysis set forth in Employment
Division v. Smith in holding that a commercial photographer had no right
under article II, section 11, to refuse to photograph a same-sex "commitment"
ceremony in violation of the anti-discrimination mandate of the State's
human rights act.406 In light of the New Mexico Court of Appeals' reliance
399. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 3.
400. Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1358 (N.J. 1992).
401. "There shall be no establishment of one religious sect in preference to another; no religious
or racial test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust." N.J. CONST. art. 1, §
4.
402. Ran-Day's County Kosher, 608 A.2d at 1358.
403. S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412, 420-26 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (regardless of
husband's religious views, he had no right to rape his wife).
404. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 11.
405. 284 P.3d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012), af'd, No. 33,687, 2013 N.M. WL 4478229 (N.M.
Aug. 22, 2013).
406. Id. at 440-42. In the state supreme court, the photographer did not make any argument
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upon Smith in interpreting article II, section 11, of the New Mexico
Constitution, a claim or defense that would not prevail under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment would not likely prevail under
article II, section 11, either.
New York
Article I, section 3, of the New York Constitution provides, in part:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed in this state to all humankind; . . . but the liberty of
conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts
of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or
safety of this state.407
In Catholic Charities of the Diocese ofAlbany v. Serio 40 8 the New York
Court of Appeals announced that its methodology for evaluating free exercise
of religion and liberty of conscience claims and defenses under article I,
section 3, would not follow either the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause in Employment Division v. Smith or the Court's pre-
Smith free exercise jurisprudence, which employed the "strict scrutiny"
standard of review.4 09 At issue in Catholic Charities was the constitutionality
of New York's Women's Health and Wellness Act, which requires
employers providing group insurance coverage for medical prescriptions to
include prescription contraceptives in that coverage.410 Ten faith-based social
service organizations challenged the contraceptive coverage mandate,
arguing that it violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clauses of the
state and federal constitutions and the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. The court of appeals rejected all three arguments.41
In addressing the plaintiffs' state free exercise of religion claim, the court
noted that, in interpreting article I, section 3, "we have not applied, and we
do not now adopt, the inflexible rule of [Employment Division v.] Smith that
no person may complain of a burden on religious exercise that is imposed by
based on article II, section II, of the New Mexico Constitution. See also Friedman v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs of Bernalillo Cnty., 781 F.2d 777, 792 (10th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he goals of N.M. Const. art.
II, § II are the same as those secured by the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment.").
407. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
408. 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006).
409. Id. at 465-68.
410. The two provisions at issue have been codified at N.Y. INs. LAW § 3221(1)(16) (McKinney
2006), § 4303(cc) (McKinney 2007).
411. 859 N.E.2d at 463-69.
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a generally applicable, neutral statute."4 12 Instead, "we have held that when
the State imposes 'an incidental burden on the right to free exercise of
religion' we must consider the interest advanced by the legislation that
imposes the burden, and that '[t]he respective interests must be balanced to
determine whether the incidental burdening is justified."'413 In performing
that balancing, "substantial deference is due the Legislature, and ... the party
claiming an exemption bears the burden of showing that the challenged
legislation, as applied to that party, is an unreasonable interference with
religious freedom."4 14 "This test," the court explained, "while more protective
of religious exercise than the rule of Smith, is less so than the rule stated
(though not always applied) in a number of other federal and state cases." 4 15
In interpreting article I, section 3, of the New York Constitution, the court
of appeals declined to apply the pre-Smith "strict scrutiny" standard which, it
said, "is not the right approach to constitutionally-based claims for religious
exemptions."416 The court explained,
[W]here the State has not set out to burden religious exercise, but
seeks only to advance, in a neutral way, a legitimate object of
legislation. . . [requiring] the State to demonstrate a 'compelling'
interest in response to every claim by a religious believer to an
exemption from the law ... would give too little respect to legislative
prerogatives, and would create too great an obstacle to efficient
government. . . . Rather, the principle stated by the United States
Supreme Court in Smith-that citizens are not excused by the Free
Exercise Clause from complying with generally applicable and
neutral laws, even ones offensive to their religious tenets-should be
412. Id. at 466.
413. Id. (citing La Rocca. v. Lane, 338 N.E.2d 606, 612-13 (N.Y. 1975), (citing People v.
Woodruff, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786, 789 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966), affd, 236 N.E.2d 159 (N.Y. 1968))). In
La Rocca, the court of appeals has held that, because of the potential for bias or prejudice on the
part of jurors, an attorney who was also a Roman Catholic priest did not have a right under the free
exercise clauses of the state and federal constitutions to represent a criminal defendant in ajury trial
while he was dressed in clerical garb. 338 N.E.2d at 612-13. In Woodruff the supreme court,
appellate division, affirmed an order of contempt entered against a grand jury witness who, despite
being given a grant of immunity, refused to testify regarding the use of illegal drugs on the ground
that her religious beliefs (similar to Hinduism) prohibited her from testifying "where harm would
thereby result to others, including her coreligionists." 272 N.Y.S.2d at 788. The appellate division
held that, under the circumstances of the case, "[t]he state's interest in enforcing the power of Grand
Jury to inquire into the commission of crime is paramount to the contemner's religious right. . .
Id. at 789.
414. Catholic Charities, 859 N.E.2d at 466.
415. Id. (referring to the "strict scrutiny" standard of judicial review under which burdens
imposed on the free exercise of religion may be upheld only if the burden is the least restrictive
means of promoting a compelling state interest).
416. Id. at 467.
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the usual, though not the invariable, rule.417
Under the standard adopted by the court of appeals for evaluating claims
and defenses raised under article I, section 3, "[tlhe burden of showing that
an interference with religious practice is unreasonable, and therefore requires
an exemption from the statute, must be on the person claiming the
exemption."418 The court cautioned, however, that "[t]he burden should not
be impossible to overcome."41 9 For example, under the court's balancing test,
it would be clearly unconstitutional for the state, even through the device of
neutral laws of general application, to "abrogate the confidentiality of the
confessional," "make the Christian sacrament of communion illegal," "put
kosher slaughterhouses out of business," and "end the male celibate
priesthood." 420 "[E]ven in much less extreme cases, parties claiming an
exemption from generally applicable and neutral laws will be able to show
that the State has interfered unreasonably with their right to practice their
religion." 421' The court of appeals determined, however, that the plaintiffs in
Catholic Charities had fallen short of making such a showing.
The court recognized that the burden the Women's Health and Wellness
Act places on plaintiffs' religious practices is "a serious one," but noted that
the Act "does not literally compel them to purchase contraceptive coverage
for their employees, in violation of their religious beliefs; it only requires that
policies that provide prescription drug coverage include coverage for
contraceptives. Plaintiffs are not required by law to purchase prescription
drug coverage at all."422 In response to the plaintiffs' argument that they feel
obligated to provide such coverage "because, as religious institutions, they
must provide just wages and benefits to their employees," the court said that
"it is surely not impossible, though it may be expensive or difficult, to
compensate employees adequately without including prescription drugs in
their group health care policies." 423 The court also placed importance on the
fact that "many of plaintiffs' employees do not share their religious
beliefs." 42 4 "The employment relationship is a frequent subject of legislation,
and when a religious organization chooses to hire nonbelievers it must, at
least to some degree, be prepared to accept neutral regulations imposed to




420. Id. (quoting Michael McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1418-19 (1990)).
421. Id.
422. Id. at 468 (emphasis in original).
423. Id.
424. Id.
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permit."425 The court acknowledged that "[t]his would be a more difficult
case if plaintiffs had chosen to hire only people who share their belief in the
sinfulness of contraception."426
Weighed against the plaintiffs' interest "in adhering to the tenets of their
faith," the court took into account the "State's substantial interest in fostering
equality between the sexes, and in providing women with better health
care." 427 "The Legislature had extensive evidence before it that the absence
of contraceptive coverage for many women was seriously interfering with
both of these important goals" and "decided that to grant the broad religious
exemption that plaintiffs seek would leave too many women outside the
statute, a decision entitled to deference from the courts. "428 Although "the
Legislature might well have made another choice, ... we cannot say the choice
the Legislature made has been shown to be an unreasonable interference with
plaintiffs' exercise of their religion."429 Accordingly, the court rejected
plaintiffs' claim based upon the free exercise of religion and liberty of
conscience language of article I, section 3.430
The court of appeals decision in Catholic Charities suggests that it will
be difficult, although perhaps not impossible, for parties to succeed in raising
free exercise of religion or liberty of conscience claims and defenses under
article I, section 3, with respect to neutral laws of general application. For
example, in St. Joseph Hospital of Cheektowaga v. Novello,43 1 the appellate
division considered a challenge to legislation that authorizes a state
commission to recommend the revocation of the operating certificate of any
general hospital or nursing home when the commission determines that such
revocation is necessary "to align bed supply with regional and local needs."432
The court held that the legislation did not violate the free exercise rights of a
Catholic hospital whose certificate of operation had been revoked because it
"did not target Catholic hospitals for closing" and nothing in the legislation
itself "imposes any restrictions on religious freedom."433
The litigation interpreting article I, section 3, before the Catholic
Charities decision presents a mixed picture. In addition to the cases already
discussed,434 in In re Miller,435 the appellate division held that an Amish man







431. 840 N.Y.S.2d 263 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007).
432. Id. at 266.
433. Id. at 269.
434. See supra, note 413.
435. 684 N.Y.S.2d 368 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
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exercise grounds, to submit a photograph of himself with his application. The
court noted that the applicant sought the permit for deer hunting and that
"[d]eer hunting does not implicate a tenet of the Amish faith," particularly
where other options not requiring a license with a photograph were
available.436 In a pair of cases, the appellate division has held that welfare
recipients could not refuse, on religious grounds, to participate in an "identity
verification procedure known as finger imaging in order to remain eligible
for public assistance benefits."437 On the other hand, in Rivera v. Smith,438 the
court of appeals held that it violated article I, section 3, to subject a male
Muslim inmate to a pat frisk by a female correctional officer. And in Rourke
v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Services,439 the appellate division
held that the correctional department's termination of a Native American's
employment as a correctional officer because of his refusal to cut his hair in
conformity with the department's hair-length requirement violated his state
free exercise rights. The enforcement of the regulation could not be justified
on any penological basis where female correctional officers were allowed to
wear their hair long, where male officers hired before 1990 were permitted
to grow beards, and where the petitioner himself had been allowed to wear
his hair long for fourteen months without incident.440
North Carolina
Article I, section 13, of the North Carolina Constitution provides, "All
persons have a natural and inalienable right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own consciences, and no human authority
shall, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of
conscience." 44' And article I, section 19, prohibits "discrimination by the
State because of ... religion." 4 42 Although section 13 does not contain express
language prohibiting the establishment of a religion, it has been construed,
along with the anti-discrimination language of section 19, to include such a
prohibition, similar to the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment."3
The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that the freedom protected
by the "rights of conscience" language of article I, section 13, "is no more
extensive than the freedom to exercise one's religion, which is protected by
436. Id. at 371.
437. Medvedev v. Wing, 671 N.Y.S.2d 806, 807 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Buchanan v. Wing,
664 N.Y.S.2d 865, 867 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
438. 472 N.E.2d 1015, 1016-22 (N.Y. 1984).
439. 615 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
440. Id. at 471-73.
441. N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
442. Id. art. 1, § 19.
443. See Heritage Village Church & Missionary Fellowship, Inc. v. State, 263 S.E.2d 726, 730
(N.C. 1980).
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the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."" More
generally, the state supreme court has stated that, "[t]aken together, these
provisions [referring to art. I, § 13, the anti-discrimination language of art. I,§ 19, and the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment] may be said to coalesce into a singular guarantee of freedom of
religious profession and worship, as well as an equally firmly established
principle of separation of church and state."445 Although "the differences in
terminology in the relevant North Carolina and federal constitutional
provisions may support in some cases differences in scope of their
application,"44 6 the North Carolina Supreme Court's identification of the
protections afforded by article I, section 13, and the anti-discrimination
language of article I, section 19, with those afforded by the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses suggests that a free exercise claim or defense that
would not prevail under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
would not likely prevail under article I, section 13, either.
North Dakota
Article I, section 3, of the North Dakota Constitution provides, in part,
"The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference[,] shall be forever guaranteed in this
state," but "the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed
as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the
peace or safety of this state."" The North Dakota Supreme Court has held
that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment are
"[t]o the same effect" as article I, section 3 (formerly article I, section 4)."8
This equivalency of interpretation suggests that a free exercise claim or
defense that would not prevail under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment would not likely prevail under article I, section 3, either.449
444. In re Williams, 152 S.E.2d 317, 325 (N.C. 1967).
445. Heritage Village Church, 263 S.E.2d at 730 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). See also Harris v. Matthews, 643 S.E.2d 566, 569 (N.C. 2007) (referring to state and
federal provisions as "comparable").
446. Heritage Village Church, 263 S.E.2d at 730 n..
447. N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
448. Bendewald v. Ley, 168 N.W. 693, 696 (N.D. 1917). See also State ex rel. Heitkamp v.
Family Life Services, Inc., 616 N.W.2d 826, 838-41 (N.D. 2000) (quoting Bendewald and applying
the same standards); State v. Burckhard, 579 N.W.2d 194, 196 (N.D. 1998) (same); State v.
Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d 220 (N.D. 1982) (construing Free Exercise Clause and article 1, section 3, in
pari materia); Martian v. Martian, 328 N.W.2d 844 (N.D. 1983) (granting wife a civil divorce did
not violate the husband's rights under the free exercise guarantees of the state and federal
constitutions).
449. That suggestion is strengthened by the defeat of a citizen-initiated measure in June 2012
that would have amended the North Dakota Constitution to impose a more rigorous standard for
evaluating religious freedom claims and defenses. Initiated Constitutional Measure No. 3 would
have provided:
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Ohio
Article I, section 7, of the Ohio Constitution provides, in part, "All men
have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to
the dictates of their own conscience . .. ; nor shall any interference with the
rights of conscience be permitted."4 50 The Ohio Supreme Court has
developed its own test for evaluating state right to worship and rights of
conscience claims. Under article I, section 7, "the standard for reviewing a
generally applicable, religion-neutral state regulation that allegedly violates
a person's right to free exercise of religion is whether the regulation serves a
compelling state interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that
interest."451 "To state a prima facie free exercise claim [under art. I, § 7], the
plaintiff must show that his religious beliefs are truly held and that the
governmental enactment has a coercive affect [sic] against him in the practice
of his religion."452
A prima facie case is not made out unless there is a clear conflict between
the requirements of law and the requirements of one's religion. For example,
in State v. Bontrager,4 53 the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of
a member of the Old Order Amish faith for failure to wear hunter orange
apparel while hunting during deer gun-hunting season as required by state
law. Although the Old Order Amish faith prohibits the wearing of bright
colors (which would include hunter orange), the religion does not require its
members to engage in the hunting of deer.454 The court determined that
"hunting is not an aspect central to the Amish religion in which one must
engage to practice the religion properly."455
Oklahoma
Article I, section 2, of the Oklahoma Constitution provides, in part,
Government may not burden a person's or religious organization's religious
liberty. The right to act or refuse to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely
held religious belief may not be burdened unless the government proves it has
a compelling government interest in infringing the specific act or refusal to act
and has used the least restrictive means to further that interest. A burden
includes indirect burdens such as withholding benefits, assessing penalties, or
an exclusion from programs or access to facilities.
450. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7.
451. Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1043 (Ohio 2000).
452. Id. at 1045.
453. See 683 N.E.2d 126 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
454. Id. at 128.
455. Id. at 130. See also State v. Swartzentruber, 556 N.E.2d 531, 534 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1989)
("[N]othing in the defendant's religion compels him to hunt deer in order to follow the dictates of
his church.").
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"Perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured, and no inhabitant
of the State shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his or
her mode of religious worship. ... "456
Oklahoma courts have not explicitly equated article I, section 2, with the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, but their decisions reflect a
close congruence between First Amendment analysis and analysis under
article I, section 2.45 That congruence of interpretation may suggest that a
claim or defense that would not prevail under the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment would not likely prevail under article I, section 2, either,
though that conclusion is not entirely free from doubt.
Oregon
Article I, section 2 of the Oregon Constitution provides: "All men shall
be secure in the Natural right, to worship Almighty God according to the
dictates of their own consciences."458 Article I, section 3, provides: "No law
shall in any case whatever control the free exercise, and enjoyment of
religeous [sic] opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience."459
The Oregon Supreme Court has held that "[t]he guaranty of religious
freedom by the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution is identical in
meaning with the constitutional provisions of this state relative to the same
right although expressed in different language."4 60 The identity in meaning
does not preclude state courts from interpreting the religion clauses in the
Oregon Constitution independently of analysis conducted under the First
Amendment;4 6' however, the Oregon Supreme Court usually has interpreted
those clauses consistently with Supreme Court precedent interpreting the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.462
In interpreting article I, sections 2 and 3, the Oregon Supreme Court has
456. OKLA. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
457. See Lewellyn v. State, 592 P.2d 538, 539-40 & nn.2, 3 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (no free
exercise right to distribute a controlled substance); Wahid v. State, 716 P.2d 678, 680 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1986) (same); State ex rel. Roberts v. McDonald, 787 P.2d 466,468-69 (Okla. Civ. App. 1989)
(statute requiring licensing of all child care facilities did not violate free exercise rights of church
operating "boys ranch"); Emch v. City of Guymon, 127 P.2d 855, 859 (Okla. Crim. App. 1942)
(holding that municipal ordinance prohibiting distribution of newspapers, handbills, tracts or books
within the city limits without first securing a permit from the city clerk could not be applied to the
distribution of religious literature by Jehovah's Witnesses) (following Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940)).
458. OR. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
459. Id. § 3.
460. City of Portland v. Thornton, 149 P.2d 972, 974 (Or. 1944).
461. Cooper v. Eugene School District No. 4J, 723 P.2d 298, 306-07 (Or. 1986) (citing cases).
462. See, e.g., Emp't Div. v. Rogue Valley Youth for Christ, 770 P.2d 588, 592-93 (Or. 1989)
(Free Exercise); Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 558 P.2d 338, 342 (Or. 1976)
(Establishment Clause).
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held:
A law that is neutral toward religion or nonreligion as such, that is
neutral among religions, and that is part of a general regulatory
scheme having no purpose to control or interfere with rights of
conscience or with religious opinions does not violate the guarantees
of religious freedom in Article I, sections 2 and 3.463
The Oregon Supreme Court's interpretation of the state constitution's
religion clauses suggests a free exercise claim or defense that would not
prevail under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment would not
likely prevail under article I, sections 2 and 3, either.
Pennsylvania
Article I, section 3, of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can
of right be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship,
or to maintain any ministry against his consent; no human authority
can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of
conscience, and no preference shall ever be given by law to any
religious establishment or modes of worship.464
The "rights of conscience" and anti-preference language of article I,
section 3, have generally been interpreted consistently with Supreme Court
precedent interpreting the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the
First Amendment.4 65 For example, in Commonwealth v. Barnhart,4 66 the
Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the involuntary manslaughter
convictions of parents who, on religious grounds, had refused to obtain life-
saving treatment for their infant son. The court rejected their defenses based
on article I, section 3, and the Free Exercise Clause.467 Over the religious
objections of the child's parents, in Matter of Cabrera,4 68 the superior court
463. Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 903 P.2d 351, 361 (Or. 1995).
464. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
465. See, e.g., Christian Sch. Ass'n v. Commonwealth, Dep'tof Labor& Indus. 423 A.2d 1340,
1343-47 & n.3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980) (Free Exercise); Bishop Leonard Regional Catholic Sch. v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 593 A.2d 28, 32-34 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (Establishment
Clause).
466. 497 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
467. Id. at 620-25.
468. 552 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
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held that a state trial court had the authority to appoint a hospital as guardian
ad litem for the purpose of consenting to a course of blood transfusion therapy
(to prevent a stroke) for a six-year old with sickle cell anemia.469 The court
held that the State's parens patriae authority to protect vulnerable children
overrode the parents' rights under article I, section 3, and the Free Exercise
Clause.470
In Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon School District,47 ' the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that "[t]he protection of rights and freedoms secured by this
section of our Constitution [referring to article I, section 3] does not transcend
the protection of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution."4 72
In a very old case, the state supreme court also recognized that:
[T]he religious freedom and the rights of conscience guaranteed by
the [state] [c]onstitution do not necessarily stand in the way of the
enforcement of laws commanding or prohibiting the commission of
acts even by those who conscientiously believe it to be their religious
or moral duty to do or refrain from doing them.473
In light of these decisions, a claim or defense that would not prevail under
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment would not likely prevail
under article I, section 3, either, although that conclusion is not entirely free
from doubt.474
Rhode Island
Article I, section 3, of the Rhode Island Constitution provides, in part:
[W]e . . . declare that no person shall be . . . enforced, restrained,
molested, or burdened in body or goods; ... nor otherwise suffer on
account of such person's religious belief; and that every person shall
be free to worship God according to the dictates of such person's
conscience, and to profess and by argument to maintain such
person's opinion in matters of religion; and that the same shall in no
469. Id at 1115.
470. Id. at 1118-20.
471. 320 A.2d 362 (Pa. 1974).
472. Id. at 366-67 (alteration in original). See also St. Elizabeth's Child Care Ctr. v. Dep't of
Pub. Welfare, 989 A.2d 52, 54 n.l (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (citing Wiest, 320 A.2d 362).
473. Commonwealth v. Herr, 78 A. 68, 72 (Pa. 1910).
474. See St. Elizabeth's Child Care Center, 989 A.2d at 55 n.4 (not addressing argument that
"the decision in
[Employment Division v.] Smith does not diminish the protection afforded by Article 1, Section 3 of
the Pennsylvania
Constitution").
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wise diminish, enlarge, or affect the civil capacity of any person.475
There is very little case law interpreting the religious freedom language
of article I, section 3. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held, however,
that section 3, "is no more restrictive as to religious freedoms than the
language of the Federal Constitution."476 The court's statement may suggest
that if a free exercise claim or defense would not prevail under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, it is not likely to prevail under
article I, section 3, either.
South Carolina
Article I, section 2, of the South Carolina Constitution provides:
The General Assembly shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government or any
department thereof for a redress of grievances.477
The South Carolina Supreme Court has observed that the "language of
the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the language
of Article 1, Section 4 [now Section 2], of the Constitution of South Carolina
are, for all intents and purposes, the same."478 Thus, the same reasoning "is
applicable to both constitutional provisions."4 79 Given this equivalence of
language and interpretation, a free exercise claim or defense that would not
prevail under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment would not
likely prevail under article I, section 2, either. Although, given the paucity of
case law on the matter, that is not entirely free of doubt.
South Dakota
Article VI, section 3, of the South Dakota Constitution provides:
475. R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
476. In re Palmer, 386 A.2d 1112, 1114 n.l (R.I. 1978) (citing Bowerman v. O'Connor, 247
A.2d 82 (R.I. 1968)). See also In re Philip S., 881 A.2d 931, 935 n.9 (R.I. 2005) (noting "[slimilar
protection" under article 1, section 3).
477. S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
478. Hunt v. McNair, 187 S.E.2d 645, 648 (S.C. 1972) (alteration in original) (interpreting state
and federal free exercise and establishment clauses).
479. Id.
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The right to worship God according to the dictates of conscience
shall never be infringed. No person shall be denied any civil or
political right, privilege or position on account of his religious
opinions; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so
construed as to excuse licentiousness, the invasion of the rights of
others, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the
state.
No person shall be compelled to attend or support any ministry or
place of worship against his consent nor shall any preference be
given by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship. No
money or property of the state shall be given or appropriated for the
benefit of any sectarian or religious society or institution.480
While a number of school-aid cases have been decided under the second
paragraph of article VI, section 3, relatively few cases have been decided
under the first paragraph; no case decided under article VI, section 3 has cited
Employment Division v. Smith.
The South Dakota Supreme Court has held that the second paragraph of
article VI and similar language in article VIII, section 16, of the South Dakota
Constitution (prohibiting any unit of government from appropriating funds to
be used for "sectarian purposes") "are not mere reiterations of the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution but are more
restrictive as prohibiting aid 'in every form."'481 The state supreme court,
however, has interpreted the liberty of conscience language of the first
paragraph consistently with Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.482 Nevertheless, the lack of case
law interpreting the liberty of conscience guarantee in article VI, section 3,
especially after Smith, make it unclear whether the South Dakota Supreme
Court would follow Smith in evaluating claims and defenses based on section
3.
480. S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
481. McDonald v. Sch. Bd. of Yankton, 246 N.W.2d 93, 98 (S.D. 1976) (quoting Synod of
Dakota v. State, 50 N.W. 632, 635 (S.D. 1891)). In McDonald, the court struck down a statute
authorizing the loaning of textbooks to private, including parochial, schools. Id.
482. See, e.g., In re Northwestern Lutheran Acad., 290 N.W.2d 845, 849-51 (S.D. 1980) rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. (holding that article VI, section 3, and Free Exercise Clause did not
excuse teachers in Lutheran school from obligation to pay unemployment compensation tax); St.
Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981); State v. Van Daalan,
11 N.W.2d 523 (S.D. 1943) (holding that Jehovah's Witnesses who were distributing religious
literature which was sold on some occasions and given away free of charge on others could not be
compelled to pay retail sales tax on such sales of religious literature, and, therefore, could not be
convicted of engaging in business as retailers without a permit by the director of taxation or of
failing to make sales tax returns as required by law).
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Tennessee
Article I, section 3, of the Tennessee Constitution provides in part, "That
all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own conscience," and "that no human
authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of
conscience . . . ."483
In State ex rel. Commissioner of Transporation v. Medicine Bird,484 the
Tennessee Court of Appeals considered state and federal free exercise
defenses when the Department of Transportation brought proceedings to
discontinue the use of property containing ancient Native American graves
as burial ground in order to widen an intersection. In a careful review of the
applicable authorities, the court noted that the Tennessee Supreme Court has
not held that "the right of conscience" and "free exercise of religion"
protections under article I, section 3, "are more expansive than the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.""4 8 "To the contrary, the Court has
consistently construed and applied the free exercise protections in TENN.
CONST. art. I, § 3 using the same principles employed by the United States
Supreme Court to interpret the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment."486 The court concluded that "the degree of protection that
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3 provides for the religious freedoms of the Native
Americans is the same as that provided by the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment."487 Because the statutes on which the Department of
Transportation relied to discontinue the use of property are "facially neutral
and uniformly applicable," and "only incidentally burden the Native
Americans' religious practices and rights of conscience," the court concluded
that the statutes would be upheld as applied, so long as they were "a
reasonable means to promote a legitimate public interest."488 The court
determined that the closure of the burial ground and the relocation of the
graves and remains were a reasonable means to promote a legitimate public
interest, because the completed construction project would reduce traffic
483. TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
484. 63 S.W.3d 734 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
485. Id. at 761.
486. Id.
487. Id. at 761-62.
488. Id. at 765-66 (relying upon, inter alia, Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). See
also Tenn. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Priest Lake Cmty. Baptist Church, No. M2006-00302-COA-
R3-CV, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 391, at 23-26 & n.9 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2007) (following
Medicine Bird in holding that a state law requiring day care centers to be licensed by the State could
be applied to a church operating a day care center in connection with its Bible studies without
violating either article 1, section 3, or the Free Exercise Clause).
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489congestion.
In a slightly earlier case, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that
excluding persons with religiously motivated objections to the death penalty
from jury service in capital cases did not violate their rights of conscience
under article I, section 3.490 While such exclusion "affects their ability to
translate their religious beliefs into action," article I, section 3, "does not
prevent the State from controlling religiously motivated actions for the good
of society." 491 "[T]he State has an important interest in obtaining juries that
do not contain members who, because of their religious beliefs, are unable to
follow the law or the trial court's instructions."492
The Tennessee Court of Appeals opinion in Medicine Bird suggests that
a claim or defense that would not prevail under the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment would not likely prevail under article I, section 3, of
the Tennessee Constitution, either.
Texas
Article I, section 6, of the Texas Constitution provides in part:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences. No man shall
be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to
maintain any ministry against his consent. No human authority
ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of
conscience in matters of religion, and no preference shall ever be
given by law to any religious society or mode of worship.493
Texas courts of review have not explicitly equated article I, section 6,
with the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment,
but their decisions reflect a close congruence between analysis under the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and analysis under section 6. The
489. Medicine Bird, 63 S.W.3d at 766.
490. Wolf v. Sundquist, 955 S.W.2d 626, 630-31 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
491. Id. at 631.
492. Id.
493. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
494. See Scott v. State, 80 S.W.3d 184, 191 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that article 1, section 6,
is "comparable" to the Free Exercise Clause); State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc.,
683 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1984) (requiring church operated child care facilities to be licensed and
regulated does not violate the religion clauses of either the state or federal constitution); In re
Marriage of Knighton, 723 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex. App. 1987) ("[The State cannot prefer the
religious views of one parent over the other in deciding the best interest of a child" in a child custody
dispute.) (relying on both state and federal religion clauses); Watts v. Watts, 563 S.W.2d 314, 316-
17 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (same); Salvaggio v. Barnett, 248 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952)
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Texas Court of Appeals has repeatedly cited and relied upon the Supreme
Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith in rejecting freedom of
religion claims brought under article I, section 6, against neutral laws of
general application.4 95 For example, in Ramos, the court held that "[r]eligious
freedoms are not implicated by neutral laws governing activities the
government has the right to regulate merely because some religious groups
may be disproportionately affected."49 6 Similarly, in Voice of Cornerstone
Church Corp. v. Pizza Property Partners,497 the court noted that "Texas
courts have routinely rejected the notion that a facially neutral, otherwise
valid restrictive covenant violates constitutional religious freedom
protections if applied against a church." 498 The Texas Supreme Court,
however, has not yet decided "whether to construe article I, section 6 of the
Texas Constitution as [Employment Division v.] Smith construed the federal
Free Exercise Clause."49 Accordingly, it cannot be determined whether
Smith will ultimately control the analysis of claims and defenses based on
article I, section 6.
Utah
Article I, section 4, of the Utah Constitution provides in part, "The rights
of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. . .""o
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that "the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution are repeated almost verbatim in article I, section 4,"o' but the
court has not yet decided "whether the [state] free exercise clause ... provides
protection over and above that provided by the First Amendment to the
(same).
495. See Mauldin v. Tex. State Bd. of Plumbing Exam'rs, 94 S.W.3d 867, 872 (Tex. App. 2002)
(holding that state licensing board could require plumbers to provide social security numbers as a
condition of licensure); Ramos v. State, 934 S.W.2d 358, 367-68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (excusing
jurors who are opposed to the death penalty on moral or religious grounds does not violate their
religious freedom).
496. 934 S.W.2d at 367.
497. 160 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. App. 2005).
498. Id. at 672.
499. Barr v. City of Sinton, 295 S.W.3d 287, 296 n.37 (Tex. 2009) (deciding case under the
Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act). See also HEB Ministries, Inc. v. Tex. Higher Educ.
Coordinating Board, 235 S.W.3d 627 (Tex. 2007) (not deciding issue).
500. UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 4.
501. Soc'y of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 935 n.43 (Utah 1993) (citing Brad C.
Smith, Comment, Be No More Children: An Analysis ofArticle 1, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution,
1992 Utah L. Rev. 1431, 1457 ("[T]he 1895 Constitution incorporated the religion clauses of the
Federal Constitution.")).
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United States Constitution."502 Accordingly, it cannot be determined whether
the Utah Supreme Court will follow Smith in evaluating claims and defenses
based on article I, section 4.
Vermont
Chapter I, article 3, of the Vermont Constitution provides in part:
That all persons have a natural and unalienable right, to worship
Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own consciences and
understandings, as in their opinion shall be regulated by the word of God; ...
and that no authority can, or ought to be vested in, or assumed by, any power
whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner control the
rights of conscience, in the free exercise of religious worship."
The Vermont Supreme Court has not yet decided whether to adopt, as a
matter of state constitutional interpretation, federal free exercise analysis, as
set forth in Smith.5" In cases decided both before and after Brady v. Dean,
however, the state supreme court has applied the Supreme Court's First
Amendment free exercise jurisprudence."os In Brady, the court held that, even
under the pre-Smith jurisprudence, town clerks could not refuse on religious
grounds to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples where the clerks had
the option of delegating the task to assistant town clerks who did not share
their reservations.o 6 In the court's opinion, the alleged burden on the town
clerks' rights of conscience (in delegating the task to an assistant clerk) was
simply too "indirect and attenuated" to be given constitutional protection.07
The Vermont Supreme Court's decisions interpreting chapter I, article 3,
suggest that a claim or defense that would not prevail under the Free Exercise
Clause of the United States Constitution would not likely prevail under
chapter I, article 3, either.
502. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 129 (Utah 1998). See also State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726,
738 (Utah 2006) (quoting Jeffs).
503. VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 3.
504. See Brady v. Dean, 790 A.2d 428, 433 (Vt. 2001).
505. See State v. De La Bruere, 577 A.2d 254, 268-72 & n.15 (Vt. 1990) (concluding that
chapter 1, article 3, of the Vermont Constitution did not afford any greater protection to parents
prosecuted for violating truancy law than does the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment);
Turner v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington, Vermont, 987 A.2d 960, 972-73 & n.6 (Vt. 2009)
(holding that under Smith, Free Exercise Clause did not bar application of common law tort of
negligent hiring to Catholic diocese). But see Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d 843, 852-53 (Vt. 1994)
(holding that chapter 1, article 3, does not provide "any greater protection [to religious freedom]
than that afforded by strict scrutiny" under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
506. 790 A.2d at 34-35.
507. Id.
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Virginia
Article I, section 16, of the Virginia Constitution provides in part, "all
men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the
dictates of conscience" and "the General Assembly shall not prescribe any
religious test whatever, or confer any peculiar privileges or advantages on
any sect or denomination."sos The Virginia Supreme Court has not expressly
equated the "free exercise" and anti-establishment clauses of article I, section
16, with the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment. Nevertheless, Professor Howard, a leading commentator on the
Virginia Constitution, has observed, "Virginia's courts, in interpreting § 16,
follow the federal approach closely."so9 The case law supports Professor
Howard's observation.510
In Horen v. Commonwealth,"" the Virginia Court of Appeals construed
article I, section 16, and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
together. The court held that a state statute proscribing possession of wild
bird parts was not religiously neutral, because it made exceptions for some
sectarian uses but not religious ones. The state statute could not be applied to
a Native American couple that had been prosecuted for possession of owl
feathers for religious use, unless the State proved that it had selected the least
restrictive means of promoting a compelling state interest.512 "Where the state
creates a mechanism for legitimate individualized exceptions but fails to
include religious uses among those legitimate exceptions, discriminatory
intent may be inferred.""' The court determined that the State failed to meet
its burden and reversed the defendants' convictions.5 14
Although Horen concerned a law that was not religiously neutral, the
court of appeals cited Smith for the proposition that "a religiously neutral law
of general application that substantially burdens the free exercise of religion
508. VA. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
509. A. E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 296 (1974).
510. Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church of Wash., 553 S.E.2d 511, 515 (Va. 2001) ("The Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 1, § 16
of the Commonwealth of Virginia do not permit a circuit court to substitute its secular judgment for
a church's judgment when the church makes decisions regarding the selection or retention of its
pastor."); Habel v. Indus. Dev. Auth. of the City of Lynchburg, 400 S.E.2d 516, 518 (Va. 1991)
(treating the Supreme Court's construction of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as
"helpful and persuasive . . . in construing the analogous state constitutional provision."). The
Commission on Constitutional Revision, which drafted the present state constitution, noted that "in
American constitutional law, state and federal, religious freedom has two independent aspects: free
exercise of religion, and no establishment of religion." COMM'N ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION,
THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA[:] REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
101 (1969).
511. 479 S.E.2d 553 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
512. Id at 557.
513. Id. (citation omitted).
514. Id. at 560.
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will survive free exercise challenge where the law rationally advances a
legitimate state interest.""'1 The court of appeals' reliance on Smith to
construe the state and federal free exercise guarantees together, and the state
supreme court's practice of relying upon federal precedent in interpreting the
state free exercise guarantee, suggests that a claim or defense that would not
prevail under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment would not
likely prevail under article I, section 16, either.
Washington
Article I, section 11, of the Washington Constitution provides in part:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment,
belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no
one shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on account
of religion; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be
so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices
inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state. 16
In interpreting the "freedom of conscience" guarantee of article I, section
11, the Washington Supreme Court does not follow the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as set
forth in Smith.' The state supreme court has held that in any case brought
under the first sentence of section 11, "the complaining party must first prove
[that] the government action has a coercive effect on the practice of
religion."' "Once a coercive effect is established, the burden of proof shifts
to the government to show the restrictions serve a compelling state interest
and are the least restrictive means for achieving the government objective."519
"If no compelling state interests exist," or if the restrictions are not "the least
restrictive means" available to achieve the government objective, "the
515. Id. at 557.
516. WASH. CONST. art. 1, I1.
517. See First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 187 (Wash. 1993)
("A facially neutral, even-handedly enforced statute that does not directly burden free exercise may,
nonetheless, violate article 1, section 11, if it indirectly burdens the exercise of religion."). See also
id. at 189 ("Article 1, section 11, of our state constitution, which absolutely protects the free exercise
of religion, extends broader protection than the First Amendment of the federal constitution.");
Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark Cnty., 995 P.2d 33, 38-44 (Wash. 2000) (same) (upholding
requirement that church apply for a non-conforming use).
518. First United Methodist Church of Seattle, Inc. v. Hearing Exam'r for the Seattle
Landmarks Pres. Bd., 916 P.2d 374, 378 (Wash. 1996) (stating that city's landmark designation of
church building violated church's right to free exercise of religion). See also First Covenant Church
of Seattle, 840 P.2d at 183 (same).
519. First United Methodist Church of Seattle, Inc., 916 P.2d at 378.
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restrictions are unconstitutional."5 20
The threshold inquiry in a free exercise case under article I, section 11,
is whether the enactment in question has a "coercive effect" upon a person
"in the practice of his religion."52 ' The challenged state action "must
somehow compel or pressure the individual to violate a tenet of his religious
belief."522 If it does not, then the challenge fails.5 23
In State v. Balzer,5 24 the Washington Court of Appeals rejected a free
exercise defense in a prosecution for illegal possession of marijuana.525 The
court said, "We will not create a constitutional safe harbor for marijuana use
because there is no realistic or sensible less restrictive means [other than
criminal prohibition] to enforce or regulate the use of marijuana."526
The Washington Supreme Court's selection of the strict scrutiny standard
ofjudicial review suggests that at least some claims and defenses that would
not prevail under the Supreme Court's test in Smith might prevail under
article I, section 11.
West Virginia
Article III, section 15, of the West Virginia Constitution provides in part:
[N]or shall any man be enforced, restrained, molested or burthened,
in his body or goods, or otherwise suffer, on account of his religious
opinions or belief, but all men shall be free to profess, and by
argument, to maintain their opinions in matters of religion; and the
same shall, in no wise, affect, diminish or enlarge their civil
527
capacities ....
520. Id. In addition to the landmark designation cases cited above, the Washington Supreme
Court has held that an ordinance authorizing an administrative delay of up to fourteen months in
issuing a demolition permit for any structure more than fifty years old, or "places of historic value,"
could not constitutionally be applied to a Catholic bishop who sought a permit to demolish an old
school building and replace it with a new pastoral center. Munns v. Martin, 930 P.2d 318 (Wash.
1997).
521. First Covenant Church of Seattle, 840 P.2d at 187 (Wash. 1992) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
522. Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Wash. 1989) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
523. In Witters, the court determined that denying vocational assistance funds to a disabled
person who wanted to study for the clergy did not require the applicant for such funds "to violate
any tenet of his religious beliefs," nor did it deny him any benefits "because of conduct mandated
by religious belief." 771 P.2d at 1123 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
524. 954 P.2d 931 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
525. Id. at 935-42.
526. Id. at 941.
527. W. VA. CONST. art. Ill, § 15.
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The freedom of "religious opinions or belief' guarantee of article III,
section 15, which was based upon Thomas Jefferson's Virginia Statute of
Religious Freedom of 1785, has not been the subject of much litigation. In
its most recent decision interpreting section 15, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held that freedom of religion language of section 15 did not
require a county school board to provide free bus transportation or a stipend
in lieu thereof to children attending a parochial school.528 The decision in
Cooper v. Board ofEducation ofSummers County, does not shed much light
on whether the state supreme court would interpret section 15 independently
of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, nor do the court's other
cases interpreting section 15.
In a decision that predates the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, the
West Virginia Supreme Court rejected a free exercise challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute requiring a standard serological (blood) test as a
condition to the issuance of a marriage license.529 Applying the strict scrutiny
standard of review, the court held that a serological test is a "minimally
intrusive means" of achieving the State's compelling interests in "detect[ing]
syphilis, protect[ing] the health interests of prenuptial couples and
protect[ing] the future children of the married couple."530 In an older case, the
state supreme court held that under article III, section 15, a person who had
a religious objection to serving on a jury could not be held in contempt of
court for his refusal.5 1' The court found that the sincerity of the defendant's
position was "given credence by his indication that he would rather go to jail
than serve on a grand jury." 532 In the court's view, "under the modem
consideration of the freedom of religion provisions of the Federal and State
Constitutions, the defendant's refusal ... to serve as a juror, when considered
in light of conditions now prevailing, would be considered justified."5 3 In
referring to the "conditions now prevailing," the court apparently meant that
the defendant's refusal to serve would not "affect the peace and safety of the
state" or prevent the State from being assured of obtaining "an adequate
number of competent jurors. . ..
Given the paucity of cases interpreting the freedom of religion guarantee
of article III, section 15, especially any cases decided after Smith, it cannot
be determined whether the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals would
follow Smith in evaluating claims and defenses based on section 15.
528. State ex. rel Cooper v. Bd. of Educ. of Summers Cnty., 478 S.E.2d 341 (W. Va. 1996)
(citing Janasiewicz v. Bd. of Educ., 299 S.E.2d 34 (W. Va. 1982).
529. In re Kilpatrick, 375 S.E.2d 794 (W. Va. 1988).
530. Id. at 797-98.
531. State v. Everly, 146 S.E.2d 705 (W. Va. 1966).
532. Id. at 708.
533. Id.
534. Id.
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Wisconsin
Article I, section 18, of the Wisconsin Constitution provides in part, "The
right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of
conscience shall never be infringed; . . . nor shall any control of, or
interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted . . . ."' The
Wisconsin Supreme Court continues to apply the pre-Smith federal standard
in evaluating right to worship and rights of conscience claims under the state
constitution. To challenge a statute under article I, section 18, a party must
prove:
(1) that he or she has a sincerely held religious belief, (2) that is
burdened by application of the state law at issue. Upon such proof,
the burden shifts to the State to prove: (3) that the law is based on a
compelling state interest, (4) which cannot be served by a less
restrictive alternative."'
If the challenger meets his burden under the first two elements of the test
and the State fails to meet its burden under either of the latter two elements,
the challenge succeeds.
In Miller, the state supreme court recognized that requiring members of
the Old Order Amish religious community to display a red and orange
triangular "slow-moving vehicle" (SMV) emblem on their horse-drawn
buggies would burden their sincerely held religious beliefs."' Although the
State has a "compelling interest in public safety on the highways," it failed
to demonstrate "that its interest [could not] be met by alternative means that
are less restrictive of the challengers' free exercise of religion."" As an
alternative to the objectionable SMV emblem, the Amish proposed that they
place white reflective tape around the perimeter of their buggies and, at night
or during inclement weather, carry an illuminated red lantern attached to the
rear lower left of their buggies.' Based upon expert testimony that white
reflective tape is more visible than the red and orange SMV emblem required
by state law, the supreme court held that the State had failed to meet its
burden that its compelling interest in highway safety could not be secured by
a less restrictive alternative.540
In Noesen v. State of Wisconsin Department of Regulation and
535. WiS. CONST. art. 1, § 18.
536. State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 240 (Wis. 1996).
537. Id. at 241.
538. Id.
539. Id. at 237 & n.2, 241.
540. Id. at 241-42.
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Licensing,5 4 1 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld an order of the circuit
court affirming the Pharmacy Examining Board's decision reprimanding a
pharmacist for refusing to fill or transfer a prescription for contraceptives
based on his sincerely held religious beliefs. The court of appeals determined
that when a pharmacist is merely required "to make the extent of his religious
belief and objections known to his employer before the commencement of
his practice at the pharmacy,"54 2 he has failed to meet his burden. That
requirement would "facilitate, rather than burden, [his] ability to exercise his
conscientious objection in the future."543
Wyoming
Article 1, section 18, of the Wyoming Constitution provides in part:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
without discrimination or preference shall be forever guaranteed in
this state ... but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be
so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state."
There is relatively little case law discussing article 1, section 18, but what
little there is indicates that the Wyoming Supreme Court would not interpret
the "free exercise" and "liberty of conscience" guarantees of section 18 more
broadly than the Supreme Court has interpreted the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment.
In Trujillo v. State,5 45 a defendant convicted of possession with intent to
deliver psilocybin mushrooms argued that his trial counsel was ineffective
for not seeking to dismiss the charge on the grounds that "the statutes
criminalizing drug possession with intent to deliver violate his constitutional
right to freely exercise his religion" under article 1, section 18, and the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.546 Relying upon the Supreme
Court's decision in Smith, the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected the
defendant's argument. Even assuming that the defendant could establish that
he used drugs pursuant to his religious beliefs (which, in any event, would
not explain his possession with intent to deliver the drugs), he could not
demonstrate that the challenged laws were "anything other than valid and
541. 751 N.W.2d 385 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
542. Id. at 393 (quoting Decision of Feb. 3, 2006, Case No. 05CV 212, Barron County
(Wisconsin) Circuit Court, p. 15 (circuit court opinion affirming disciplinary order)).
543. Id. (quoting Decision of Feb. 3, 2006 (circuit court opinion)).
544. WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 18.
545. 2 P.3d 567 (Wyo. 2000).
546. Id. at 575.
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neutral laws of general applicability."547 Under the analysis set forth in Smith,
the defendant was "bound to obey [those laws] regardless of his religious
beliefs."548 Because a motion to dismiss relying on defendant's free exercise
claim "would have been without merit," the court concluded that "trial
counsel's performance was not deficient." 549
The Wyoming Supreme Court's reliance on Smith in addressing a state
free exercise defense suggests that a claim or defense that would not prevail
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment would not likely
prevail under article I, section 18, either.
OTHER MATTERS
"Hybrid Rights " Claims and Defenses
As was noted in the Introduction,"' in Smith, the Supreme Court
distinguished cases in which a free exercise of religion claim or defense was
combined with the assertion of another federal constitutional right (e.g., free
speech or the right of parents to control the upbringing of their children) from
those in which only a free exercise claim or defense was at stake. Whether
the Court cited such cases as examples of a recognized exception or simply
to explain why they did not dictate the outcome in Smith is unclear. What is
clear is that, with very few exceptions,55 1 no state court has upheld a "hybrid
rights" claim or defense under the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with
some other federal constitutional right that did not involve the rights of
547. Id. at 577.
548. Id.
549. Id.
550. See supra text accompanying notes. 6-7.
551. See, e.g., First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 181-82 (Wash.
1992) (recognizing "hybrid rights" claim involving free exercise and free speech in the context of a
municipality's authority to confer "landmark status" on churches, andagreeing with the plaintiff that
"when the State controls the architectural 'proclamation' of religious belief inherent in [a] church's
exterior it effectively burdens religious speech."); Scott v. State, 80 S.W.3d 184, 193, 197 (Tex.
App. 2002) (free exercise and free speech claims) (holding that indigent defendant could not be
required to "swear or affirm" under penalties of perjury that he was impecunious for purposes of
obtaining a free transcript and appointed counsel on appeal from his criminal conviction where
defendant, who had religious objections to oaths and affirmations, was willing to "vow" that he
would tell the truth and that he would do so under any penalties that were the equivalent to the
penalties for perjury for those whose statements were given under oath or on affirmation). Most
attempts (in state court) to create a "hybrid rights" issue by combining a federal free exercise claim
or defense with a federal free speech claim or defense have been rejected. See, e.g., Thomas v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 102 P.3d 937, 943-44 & n.38 (Alaska 2004); North Coast
Women's Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Superior Court, 189 P.3d 959, 967-68 (Cal. 2008); Catholic
Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 194-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001),
aff'd, 85 P.3d 67, 87-88 (Cal. 2004); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428,443 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2012), aff'd, No. 33,687, 2013 WL 4478229, at *21 (N.M. 2013); Catholic Charities of the
Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 464-65 (N.Y. 2006); Church at 295 S. 18th St., St.
Helen's v. Emp't Dep't, 28 P.3d 1185, 1192-94 (Ore. Ct. App. 2001).
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parents.552 No state court has upheld a "hybrid rights" claim or defense that
combined a federal free exercise of religion claim or defense with a federal
freedom of association claim or defense.
Individualized Exemptions
In addition to distinguishing cases in which a free exercise of religion
claim or defense was combined with the assertion of another federal
constitutional right, the Supreme Court in Smith also distinguished cases (all
involving the denial of unemployment compensation benefits) "where the
State has in place a system of individualized exemptions. . . ."5 In such
cases, the State "may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious
hardship' without compelling reason."' Although one or two state courts,
applying federal constitutional analysis, have upheld a free exercise claim
where the State or municipality had in place a "system of individualized
exemptions,"55 most such claims and defenses have been rejected as not
falling within the limited scope of that exception.5 In Catholic Charities,
552. "Hybrid rights" claims or defenses involving federal free exercise and parental rights were
sustained in People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 134-44 (Mich. 1993) (home schooling). See also
Shepp v. Shepp, 906 A.2d 1165, 1172-74 (Pa. 2006) (holding that divorced father could not be
prohibited from teaching his minor child about polygamy, plural marriage, or multiple wives in the
absence of evidence that his advocacy of such religious beliefs would jeopardize the physical or
mental health of the child); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138-39 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
(holding that in custody dispute between divorced parents, father could not be barred from taking
his children to religious services contrary to the mother's faith during periods of lawful custody or
visitation). Parental rights may not be asserted by third persons, however, in order to create a "hybrid
rights" issue. See, e.g., Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High School, 487 N.W.2d
857, 863 (Minn. 1992); S. Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus
Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 721-22 (N.J. 1997); Health Services Div. v. Temple Baptist
Church, 814 P.2d 130, 136 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); In re N.Y. State Emp't Relations Bd. v. Christ
the King Reg'I High Sch., 682 N.E.2d 960, 964 (N.Y. 1997).
553. See City Chapel Evangelical Free, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 744 N.E.2d 443, 454-55
(Ind. 2001) (Shepard, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (Boehm, J., dissenting); Hill-Murray, 487
N.W.2d at 862-62; State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1990) ("hybrid rights"
defense was "arguable," but case was decided on other grounds); S. Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers
Org., 696 A.2d at 721-22; Catholic Charities ofthe Diocese ofAlbany, 859 N.E.2d at 464-65.
554. 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
555. Id. (citation omitted).
556. See Stinemetz v. Kansas Health Care Policy Auth., 252 P.3d 141, 152-56 (Kan. Ct. App.
2011) (applying exception to strike down state agency's refusal to reimburse Medicaid-eligible
patient for an out-of-state "bloodless liver transplant"); First Covenant Church, 840 P.2d at 181
(overturning landmark designation).
557. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 192-93
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001), aff'd, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004); Shagalow v. State, Dep't of Human Services,
725 N.W.2d 380, 388-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); Health Services Div. v. Temple Baptist Church,
814 P.2d 130, 135-36 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); Henley v. City of Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals,
1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3171, at *11-12 (Ohio Ct. App. Jun. 30, 1999); Shumaker v. Ohio Dep't of
Human Services, 691 N.E.2d 690, 700-01 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Church at 295 S. 18th Street, 28
P.3d at 1191-92; Tenn. Dep't of Human Services v. Priest Lake Cmty. Baptist Church, 2007 Tenn.
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the California Court of Appeal explained that under the established case law,
the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review does not apply "any time
statutory exemptions of any kind are enacted by the Legislature," but does
apply where "there is a mechanism of exemptions open to unfettered
discretionary interpretation," and "the bureaucratic discretion is enforced in
a discriminatory manner against religion.""'
State Constitutional Limitations on Religious Freedom
In twenty states, the constitutional provisions guaranteeing religious
freedom (however expressed), by their own terms, do not "excuse acts of
licentiousness" or "justify practices inconsistent with the peace and[/or]
safety" of the State.' An interesting question that has seldom been addressed
is whether such language not only limits the reach of religious freedom, but
also the State's authority to restrict religious freedom. In other words, is the
State's authority to restrict religious freedom (including conduct based upon
beliefs) in these states limited to preventing "acts of licentiousness" and
"practices inconsistent with the peace and safety" of the State? Two state
courts have held that the State's authority is so limited,560 while one state
court has held otherwise.5 6 1 No state court has defined "acts of
App. LEXIS 391, at *42-48 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2007). See also Korean Buddhist Dae Won
Sa Temple v. Sullivan, 953 P.2d 1315, 1344-47 & n.31 (Haw. 1998) (holding that city's variance
law "clearly creates a 'system of individualized exemptions' from the general zoning law," but
concluding that height restrictions on structures did not substantially burden the temple's free
exercise of religion and, therefore, did not need to be justified by a narrowly tailored compelling
interest) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884).
558. 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192.
559. Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Washington and Wyoming. The text of the provisions, the precise language
of which varies (some religious freedom guarantees may exclude "injuries to morals" or acts that
"interfere" with the worship of others) may be found in the respective state analyses, supra State by
State Analyses.
560. Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 242 (Mass. 1994) (stating that if a person's
religiously motivated conduct does "not disturb the public peace or obstruct others in their religious
worship," then part 1, article 2, of the Massachusetts Constitution "gives absolute protection to the
manner in which one worships God" and "[n]o balancing of interests, the worshiper's, on the one
hand, and the government's, on the other, is called for . . ."); Soc'y of Jesus of New England v.
Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571, 574 (Mass. 1990) (same); State v. Hershberger, 462
N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990) (explaining that religious liberty language of state constitution
"expressly limits the governmental interests that may outweigh religious liberty" to "'practices
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state"' or "'acts of licentiousness"') (quoting MINN.
CONST. art. 1, § 16); Rasmussen v. Glass, 498 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (same).
561. North Coast Women's Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959,
969 (Cal. 2008) (rejecting argument that such language "indicates that religious objectors are free
to disregard a particular state law unless doing so compromises the peace or safety of the state or is
licentious" and interpreting CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 4).
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licentiousness," as used in its religious freedom guarantee,5 62 and only one
has stated whether "practices inconsistent with the peace and safety" of the
state (or equivalent language) refers only to breaches of the peace or has a
broader meaning.
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing survey indicates, in slightly more than one-half of the
states (twenty-six), state courts follow or may be expected to follow the
Supreme Court's decision in Smith in interpreting the religious freedom
guarantees of their state constitutions.5 In seven states (Arizona, California,
Hawaii, Missouri, Texas, Utah, and Vermont), the courts expressly stated that
they have not decided whether to follow Smith. In six states, (Georgia,
Kansas, Montana, Nevada, South Dakota, and West Virginia), it cannot be
determined whether state courts will follow Smith in interpreting their
religious freedom guarantees, either because of a paucity of case law
construing those guarantees, or conflicting decisions (Kansas). In ten states
(Alaska, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York,
Ohio, Washington, and Wisconsin), the courts have refused to follow Smith
in interpreting their state religious freedom guarantees. In one state
(Alabama), the state constitution has been amended to establish the pre-Smith
federal standard. Although phrased somewhat differently, the eleven states
refusing to follow Smith generally apply a four-part test for evaluating
religious freedom claims and defenses based on state constitutional
provisions. Initially, the person (or entity) raising such a claim or defense
must demonstrate that: first, he or she (or the entity) has a sincerely held
religious belief, and second, the belief is being burdened (or substantially
562. In modem usage, "acts of licentiousness" usually would be understood to mean "lacking
or ignoring moral or legal restraint, esp. in sexual activity," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1005 (9th
ed. 2009), but as Justice Scalia has noted, in early American usage the word "licentiousness" may
have had a much broader meaning, to wit, "'[e]xceeding the limits of law."' City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 540 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (quoting 2 AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 5 (1828)).
563. In Commonwealth v. Nissenbaum, 536 N.E.2d 592, 595-596 (Mass. 1989), the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the exception in part 1, article 2, of the
Massachusetts Constitution for conduct that "disturb[s] the public peace" was not limited to
breaches of the peace but extended to all criminal offenses, whether statutory or common law. See
also City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 540 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (arguing that provisos in certain
state constitutions that religious freedom does not extend to acts that "disturb the public peace" or
interfere with the "peace [and] safety" of the State 'apparently permitted government to deny
religious freedom, not merely in the event of violence or force, but, more generally, upon the
occurrence of illegal actions"') (quoting Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious
Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 915, 919 (1992)).
564. Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming.
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burdened) by the state action in question. Once that showing has been made,
the burden of proof shifts to the state to demonstrate that: third, the state has
a compelling interest in the matter being regulated (or prohibited), and fourth,
no less restrictive means will suffice to achieve that interest. Indiana and New
York, however, apply somewhat different tests that, while more protective of
religious liberty than the Smith standard, are less protective than the pre-
Smith federal standard followed by Alabama, Alaska, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Michigan, Ohio, Washington, and Wisconsin. Obviously, these
categories are somewhat fluid. Some state courts that have not decided
whether to follow Smith will choose to do so, some will not. Even in those
states where the courts appear to follow Smith, it is not certain that they will
do so in the future. The law is dynamic, not static.
The range of issues presented under state religious freedom guarantees is
very broad. State courts have considered the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances: prohibiting discrimination in housing and public
accommodations on the basis of marital status and/or sexual orientation;
mandating contraception coverage in prescription insurance benefits
packages; prohibiting possession of controlled substances and prohibiting
assisted suicide; regulating the medical profession; requiring photographic or
other means of identification as a condition for the issuance of state driver's
licenses and hunting licenses, or receiving public assistance benefits;
mandating certain equipment to be used on motor vehicles; regulating
hunting; and mandating vaccination of school age children. State courts have
also considered statutes and administrative rules regulating private and home
schools; ordinances governing zoning and land use (including "landmark"
designations); and rules regulating the operation of prisons. In areas of
particular contemporary public controversy (mandating contraception
coverage, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of marital status and/or
sexual orientation, and regulating private (including parochial) education and
home schools), the record has been decidedly mixed. Neither of the
challenges to statutes mandating contraception coverage in employee benefit
packages offering prescription drug coverage has succeeded even though, in
both cases, the California Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals
applied a standard of review that is less deferential to state regulation and
more protective of religious freedom than the one adopted in Smith.'
Occasionally, a challenge to an anti-discrimination statute or ordinance has
succeeded,566 but usually such challenges have not prevailed."6 Case law
565. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004); Catholic
Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006).
566. Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994); State by Cooper v. French,
460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990); Rasmussen v. Glass, 498 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
567. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 847 P.2d 271 (Alaska 1994); Thomas v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 102 P.3d 937 (Alaska 2004); North Coast Women's Care Med.
Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008); Smith v. Fair Emp't & Hous.
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involving one of the country's oldest religious minorities, the Old Order
Amish, is also mixed; the challenges prevailing in some cases... and failing
in others,' even under a more rigorous standard of review. State religious
freedom guarantees have presented no bar to civil suits and criminal
investigations into the tortious or criminal actions of members of the
clergy.7 o Finally, at least one state court has upheld a religious freedom-
based challenge to the regulation of a home school,"' but most challenges to
the regulation of private and home schools have been rejected.572
Even in the minority of states that continue to follow the pre-Smith
standard for evaluating religious freedom claims and defenses, most such
claims and defenses have been rejected. Whether that suggests that "[s]trict
scrutiny is not what it once was," but "has mellowed in recent decades" to
the point where "a state's interest is compelling if the state says it is," " is a
Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996); Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp.2d 528 (W.D. Ky.
2001) (applying both state and federal law); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428
(N.M. Ct. App. 2012), affd, No. 33,687, 2013 WL 4478229 (N.M. 2013); Brady v. Dean, 790 A.2d
438 (Vt. 2001).
568. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990) (striking down requirement that
horse-drawn buggies display brightly colored "slow moving vehicle" emblem where other
alternatives consistent with traffic safety were available); State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235 (Wis.
1996) (same).
569. In re Miller, 684 N.Y.S.2d 368 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (upholding requirement to submit
a photograph with application for a hunting license); State v. Bontrager, 683 N.E.2d 126 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1996) (upholding requirement that hunters wear bright orange apparel while hunting deer);
State v. Swartzentruber, 556 N.E.2d 531 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1989) (same).
570. See Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 871 A.2d 1208 (Me. 2005) (civil action
for negligent supervision); Archdiocese of Wash. v. Moersen, 925 A.2d 659 (Md. 2007) (allowing
civil action for breach of contract, wrongful discharge, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress based, in part, on sexual abuse to proceed); Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 2002) (negligence); Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991) (sexual harassment); Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, 482
N.W.2d 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (entering punitive damage award against archdiocese in case
involving sexual abuse of a child by a priest); Turner v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington,
Vermont, 987 A.2d 960 (Vt. 2009); Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles v. Superior Court,
32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (issuing grand jury subpoena duces tecum in the course
of grand jury investigation of clerical sexual abuse of minors); Soc'y of Jesus of New England v.
Commonwealth, 808 N.E.2d 272 (Mass. 2004) (same).
571. People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993). See also In re Welfare of T.K., 475
N.W.2d 88 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (removing children from parents' custody because of their refusal
to allow children to take standardized educational tests was "premature").
572. Triplett v. Livingston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 967 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); Blount v.
Dep't of Educational & Cultural Services, 551 A.2d 1377 (Me. 1988); Hill-Murray Fed'n. of
Teachers v. Hill-Murray High School, 487 N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 1992); Valley Christian School v.
Mont. High School Ass'n, 86 P.3d 554 (Mont. 2004); State v. De La Bruere, 577 A.2d 254 (Vt.
1990). See also St. Elizabeth's Child Care Ctr. v. Dep't of Public Welfare, 989 A.2d 52 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2010); Tenn. Dep't of Human Services v. Priest Lake Cmty. Baptist Church, No.
M2006-00302-COA-R3-CV, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2007)
(preventing operation of daycare center/Bible school hybrid by church).
573. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 105 (Cal. 2004)
(Brown, J., dissenting).
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matter of dispute. To the extent that the interpretation and application of state
constitutions fails to protect religious freedom adequately, the people of those
states may wish to amend their state constitutions, as Alabama has, to provide
greater protection, or to enact or strengthen state statutory religious freedom
restoration acts.
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Appendix
Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment, Ala. Const. art. I, § 3.01:
Section I.
The amendment shall be known as and may be cited as the Alabama
Religious Freedom Amendment.
Section II.
The Legislature makes the following findings concerning religious
freedom:
(1) The framers of the United States Constitution, recognizing free
exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First
Amendment to the Constitution, and the framers of the Constitution of
Alabama of 1901, also recognizing this right, secured the protection of
religious freedom in Article I, Section 3.
(2) Federal and state laws "neutral" toward religion may burden religious
exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.
(3) Governments should not burden religious exercise without
compelling justification.
(4) In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the United
States Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral
toward religion.
(5) The compelling interest test as set forth in prior court rulings is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing governmental interests in areas ranging from public education
(pedagogical interests and religious rights, including recognizing regulations
necessary to alleviate interference with the education process versus rights of
religious freedom) to national defense (conscription and conscientious
objection, including the need to raise an army versus rights to object to
individual participation), and other areas of important mutual concern.
(6) Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.,
§ 2000bb, to establish the compelling interest test set forth in prior federal
court rulings, but in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997), the
United States Supreme Court held the act unconstitutional stating that the
right to regulate was retained by the states.
Section III.
The purpose of the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment is to
guarantee that the freedom of religion is not burdened by state and local law;
and to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious freedom is
burdened by government.
Section IV.
As used in this amendment, the following words shall have the following
meanings:
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(1) DEMONSTRATES. Meets the burdens of going forward with the
evidence and of persuasion.
(2) FREEDOM OF RELIGION. The free exercise of religion under Article I,
Section 3, of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901.
(3) GOVERNMENT. Any branch, department, agency instrumentality, and
official (or other person acting under the color. of law) of the State of
Alabama, any political subdivision of a state, municipality, or other local
government.
(4) RULE. Any government statute, regulation, ordinance, administrative
provision, ruling guideline, requirement, or any statement of law whatsoever.
Section V.
(a) Government shall not burden a person's freedom of religion even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in
subsection (b).
(b) Government may burden a person's freedom of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person:
(1) Is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
(c) A person whose religious freedom has been burdened in violation of
this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial,
administrative, or other proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a
government.
Section VI.
(a) This amendment applies to all government rules and implementations
thereof, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after
the effective date of this amendment.
(b) Nothing in this amendment shall be construed to authorize any
government to burden any religious belief.
(c) Nothing in this amendment shall be construed to affect, interpret, or
in any way address those portions of the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution permitting the free exercise of religion or prohibiting laws
respecting the establishment of religion, or those provisions of Article I,
Section 3, of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, respecting the
establishment of religion.
Section VII.
(a) This amendment shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
and deterrent purposes.
(b) If any provision of this amendment or its application to any particular
person or circumstance is held invalid, that provision or its application is
severable and does not affect the validity of other provisions or applications
of this amendment.
